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Abstract 
Between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the Rwandan genocide 
in 1994. In 2001, Rwanda incorporated a traditional, community-based method of 
conflict resolution known as gacaca into their transitional justice program, and in 2008, 
the Rwandan government decided to use this system to try perpetrators of sexual violence 
from the genocide. This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of the gacaca court system in 
providing restorative justice to Rwandan rape survivors, concluding that gacaca has failed 
to achieve this objective. When deciding to transfer sexual crimes to the jurisdiction of 
gacaca, the Rwandan government did not reevaluate the goals that this system was 
designed to achieve, nor did it address the challenges that gacaca posed to survivors of 
sexual violence. Rather, the government considered only the practical need to expedite 
the processing of genocide cases and thus sacrificed the unique needs of survivors of 
sexual violence. I argue that community-based, women-centered organizations that focus 
their resources on addressing the practical needs of rape survivors have been more 
effective at providing “justice” to survivors of sexual violence from the genocide than the 
state system of gacaca and should therefore be incorporated into the transitional justice 
framework of Rwanda. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Between 500,000 and one million people were killed—and as many as 500,000 raped or 
otherwise sexually abused—during the one hundred days of killing in Rwanda between April 
and July, 1994 (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 11).1 Since then, prison overcrowding and 
poverty directly resulting from the genocide have claimed thousands of additional lives. To this 
day, the lives of many Rwandans are shaped by poverty, social isolation, HIV/AIDS, and 
psychological trauma. The post-genocide reconstruction effort in Rwanda was thus designed to 
address both practical concerns and the more profound social objectives associated with 
transitional justice, defined by the United Nations (2004) as “the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (1).   
In 2001, Rwanda implemented the gacaca court system as part of their transitional justice 
program. Based on a traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution, gacaca is a system of 
community-based justice which tries accused perpetrators of genocide within their own 
neighborhoods, based on their confessions and the testimony of community members. This thesis 
will explore the objectives that the gacaca system was designed to achieve and the motivations 
behind the decision to adjudicate sexual crimes through this process, with the aim of assessing 
the effectiveness of gacaca as an institution of transitional justice as it applies to survivors of 
sexual violence. But first, in order to understand the issues to which the transitional justice 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1. It is nearly impossible to estimate the number of deaths during the Rwandan genocide. 
Alison Des Forges (1999) estimates this number to be 500,000 (16), while Gérard Prunier’s 
(1997) most conservative estimate is 850,000 (265). For the purposes of this study, I adopt the 
range used by Phil Clark (2010), based on analysis by several scholars. For a discussion of the 
number of rapes committed during the genocide, see Chapter 2.  
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system in Rwanda had to respond, it is necessary to briefly review the historical context of the 
Rwandan genocide and the events that preceded it.  
 
Pre-Colonial and Colonial History of Rwanda 
 The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi people of Rwanda did not arise in a vacuum, but was 
rather the result of centuries of complicated historical processes in the region. Before the advent 
of colonialism, relative peace existed in Rwanda between the three primary ethnic and social 
groups which existed there: Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi. The Twa people, likely the original 
inhabitants of Rwanda, are a pygmoid race of hunter-gathers who probably settled in the region 
in approximately 1000 AD and now make up about one percent of the total Rwandan population 
(Clark 2010, 14). The Twa were soon followed by the Bantu-speaking Hutu people, and, again, 
in the sixteenth century by the Tutsi, herdsmen who most likely originated in southern Ethiopia 
(Clark 2010, 15). The Tutsi conquered much of Rwanda, establishing territories and placing 
Tutsi kings known as mwami at the head of Rwandan life.  
 Thus, though these ethnic groups originated from different locations in Africa, over time 
the distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi came to have more to do with social class than with 
ethnicity, per se. The meanings of these terms began to shift during the eighteenth century, with 
“Tutsi” coming to describe “a person rich in cattle…the term that referred to the elite group as a 
whole” and “Hutu” meaning a “subordinate…[the term that] came to refer to the mass of 
ordinary people” (Des Forges 1999, 32). Despite different origins, Hutu and Tutsi people shared 
a common language and religion and therefore these categories were highly permeable; Hutu 
could become Tutsi upon acquiring a certain level of wealth or prestige and intermarriage 
between the two groups was common (and remained so, even upon the eve of the genocide). 
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Although these socio-economic categories were likely a source of division and resentment in 
Rwanda, “there is no record of violence between Hutu and Tutsi in the pre-colonial era” (Clark 
2010, 16). 
 The nature of this social relationship changed drastically upon the arrival of German 
colonists in Rwanda in 1894. The Germans, noticing the existing political structures with Tutsi 
kings at the head, sought to form alliances with the mwami and other Tutsi administrators. 
Appealing to social Darwinism and the biblical story of Ham (known at the “Hamitic 
Hypothesis”), the colonial administrators exploited the existing understanding of Tutsi difference 
to justify their political alliance with the ruling class of Rwanda.2 Therefore, while socio-
economic and indeed ethnic distinctions existed between the two groups prior to colonialism, 
“[the] idea that the Tutsi were superior because they came from elsewhere, and that the 
difference between them and the local population was a racial difference, was an idea of colonial 
origin” (Mamdani 2001, 80). 
 When the Belgians gained control of Rwanda in 1919, they continued to favor the Tutsi 
leaders and expanded the existing divide between the socio-ethnic groups, while the 
reinforcement and expansion of “race policy” became a political priority. Beginning in 1925, the 
annual colonial administrative reports included extensive chapters defining the racial difference 
between Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 88). The Belgian colonial government “turned Hamitic 
racial superiority from an ideology to an institutional fact by making it the basis of changes in 
political, social, and cultural relations” (Mamdani 2001, 88). Under Belgian rule, education, 
taxation, and the Church were reorganized around this concept of difference. Hutu people were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2. For more information regarding the Hamitic Hypothesis and how it operated to 
“racialize” the difference between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, consult Mahmood Mamdani’s 
When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2001). 
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forced into a nationwide system of forced labor and the government extracted taxes and crops 
from the Hutu population at extremely high rates (Mamdani 2001, 95). In 1933, the colonists 
solidified the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi by conducting an official census and requiring 
every Rwandan to carry an ethnic identity card indicating whether he or she was Twa, Hutu, or 
Tutsi. These identity cards remained a requirement for all Rwandans until they were abolished 
following the genocide (Clark 2010, 17).  
 
Independence, the “Hutu Revolution,” and Civil War 
Recognizing the global shift toward decolonization during the 1950s, the Belgians 
attempted to prepare Rwanda for a transition to democracy. Knowing that the Hutu majority 
would likely take political control of the nation under a democratic system, the colonists began 
allowing Hutu into the civil service and promoting them to positions of influence in an attempt to 
“ensure a smooth transfer of power” (Clark 2010, 17). Starting in 1960, the Belgians replaced 
many Tutsi chiefs with Hutu ones and organized elections, throwing their support behind the 
Hutu political party Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU) 
(Prunier 1997, 51). This shift in allegiance from Tutsi to Hutu—after a half-century of the 
reinforcement of Tutsi dominance by colonial powers—had a destabilizing effect on the people 
of Rwanda, and the 1960s “were characterized by the first recorded instances of mass violence 
between Hutu and Tutsi” (Clark 2010, 18). Following independence in 1962, the Hutu majority 
cemented near-absolute political leadership of the nation, and engaged in violent persecution of 
the Tutsi population from the outset. The approximately thirty years between independence and 
the genocide were known as the “Hutu Republic” and were characterized by state-sanctioned 
violence against the Tutsi population in Rwanda, “in an almost continuous if irregular stream 
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between 1959…1972” (Prunier 1997, 61). During this time, approximately 20,000 Tutsi were 
killed (Des Forges 1999, 40), and over 300,000 were forced to flee to Burundi, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Prunier 1997, 62). 
This pattern of Hutu dominance continued when General Juvénal Habyarimana took 
power in 1973 and established a single-party state. Habyarimana’s regime was characterized by 
tightened control (through the continued use of ethnic identity cards and strict censuses of birth, 
death, and geographical movement); mobilization of the armed forces; the reinstallation of the 
unpaid, communal labor established by the colonial regimes; and intense propaganda campaigns 
designed to glorify Habyarimana, his party, and his Hutu ethnic group (Des Forges, 1999). 
By the late 1980s approximately 600,000 Rwandan Tutsis were living in exile (Des 
Forges 1999, 48). Some of the Tutsi refugees who had fled to Uganda following the Hutu 
violence in the 1960s established the political and military organization known as the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1990, this organization attacked Rwanda, “proclaiming its goals to 
be…the return of the refugees…the ouster of Habyarimana and the establishment of a more 
democratic government” (Des Forges 1999, 48). Though the RPF forces were driven back within 
three days, the attack proved to be a turning point in the Habyarimana regime, serving as both a 
rallying call for support of the government in the face of “external” threats and as a justification 
for increased suppression of those Tutsis within Rwanda. Additionally, this attack resulted in 
financial and military support for the Habyarimana regime from France, Belgium, and Zaire (Des 
Forges 1999, 49-50).3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3. Some scholars believe that the attack was in fact staged by the Habyarimana 
government for exactly these purposes. For more on this theory, consult Alison Des Forges’s 
Leave None to Tell the Story (1999), pages 49-51. 
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From this point forward, “events both within and outside of Rwanda exacerbated ethnic 
tensions” (Clark 2010, 13). Guerrilla war continued for three years near the Ugandan border 
between the Hutu-led Rwandan government and the RPF. The Burundian President, a Hutu, was 
assassinated by a Tutsi-led army in 1993, inspiring the massacre of tens of thousands of 
Burundians—both Hutu and Tutsi (Des Forges 1999, 5)—and the flight of thousands of refugees 
to Rwanda (Clark 2010, 13). The Habyarimana regime heavily promoted extremist media 
sources and propaganda which called explicitly for violence against the Tutsi population, and 
began training Hutu youth militias known as Interahamwe to attack Tutsi civilians (Clark 2010, 
13).4  
Thus, by April 6, 1994, the stage was set for genocide in Rwanda. On this day, a plane 
carrying President Habyarimana, along with the Burundian President Cyprien Ntaramira, was 
shot down, killing everyone on board. Within an hour, the Rwandan national army (Forces 
armées rwandaises, or FAR) and the Interahamwe in Kigali began setting up roadblocks, 
checking ethnic identity cards, and killing Tutsi politicians and civilians as well as “moderate” 
Hutu accused of collaborating with Tutsi. The killing rapidly spread beyond the capital city of 
Kigali, and within two weeks approximately 250,000 Tutsi were killed (Clark 2010, 14). By 
July, between 500,000 and one million Tutsi were murdered. 
At least, that is one version of the story. It is important to note that many details of 
Rwandan pre-colonial history, including the degree to which Hutu and Tutsi have historically 
coexisted, their understanding of ethnic difference prior to colonization, and the geographic and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4. According to Phil Clark (2010), Interahamwe is translated from the Kinyarwanda as 
“those who stand together” or “those who fight together” (13). 
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ethnic origins of the two groups, remain contested.5 Despite differing interpretations, scholars 
agree that the genocidal violence that occurred in 1994 was not based on “ancient” or “tribal” 
hatred between Hutu and Tutsi. While prejudice, resentment, and discrimination between the two 
groups surely existed in Rwandan society before colonialism, these divisions were intentionally 
exploited by (and escalated rapidly under the influence of) European colonists. Importantly, this 
understanding of history is actively promoted by the Rwandan government, meaning that 
average Rwandans today are taught that the origins of Hutu/Tutsi ethnic tension were a direct 
result of the negative influence of colonialism. Moreover, several Western nations supported the 
genocidal policies of the FAR, and international legal bodies, including the United Nations, all 
but ignored the genocidal violence that was occurring in Rwanda. When examining the 
transitional justice system in Rwanda and the role that Western organizations should play in 
reconstructing Rwandan society following the genocide, it is important to consider Rwandans’ 
perceptions of Western influence in their history and their understandable resistance, in some 
cases, to adopting “Western” models of justice.  
 The unique nature of the psychological trauma suffered by survivors of the Rwandan 
genocide also played a role in what kind of transitional justice system could be established after 
the genocide. Rather than occupying two historically distinct racial categories, Hutu and Tutsi 
coexisted in Rwanda for centuries prior to the genocide. Shared language, religion, culture, and 
history shaped the relationship between these two groups, and centuries of social mobility, 
cohabitation, and intermarriage resulted in close-knit Rwandan communities of both ethnic 
groups that, even during the twentieth century, were grounded more in commonality than in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5. My summary of pre-colonial Rwandan history and the ethnic and/or socio-economic 
origins of the Hutu-Tutsi distinction is based largely off of the analysis of Phil Clark (2010), 
Mahmood Mamdani (2001), and Alison Des Forges (1999).  
 8!
difference. When average Hutu civilians raped and killed Tutsi civilians by the hundreds of 
thousands, they turned against their own friends, neighbors, and family members. Many of the 
objectives of the gacaca court were therefore shaped by Rwanda’s historical context, including 
the desire to adopt a transitional justice mechanism that was consistent with Rwandan culture 
and the need to address the unique psychological trauma that resulted from the genocide. 
 
Research Question and Methodology  
 This thesis attempts to answer a fairly basic question: As an institution of transitional 
justice, how effective has gacaca been in providing restorative justice for survivors of sexual 
violence during the Rwandan genocide?  This study provides a qualitative analysis of the 
existing literature on sexual assault as a weapon of genocide, the gacaca court system in Rwanda, 
and the theoretical framework behind transitional justice, using a multidisciplinary approach 
which combines historical, legal, and theoretical scholarship with testimonies from rape 
survivors about their experiences testifying in the gacaca courts.  
 It is my conclusion that gacaca has not been an effective mechanism for providing 
restorative justice for survivors of sexual violence when viewed through a transitional justice 
framework. Rather, my research shows that the specific needs of rape survivors were sacrificed 
within the gacaca system in order to pursue the pragmatic objectives of the Rwandan state, and 
that while gacaca might be “restorative” to the Rwandan society as a whole, the process is most 
often harmful to individual survivors of sexual violence.  
The following chapters review the historical, legal, and cultural contexts in which 
survivors of sexual assault from the Rwandan genocide live today. Chapter 2 discusses the 
widespread and systematic sexual violence that occurred during the Rwandan genocide, outlining 
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the specific ways in which sexual violence was used as a strategic weapon to achieve the 
genocidal objective of the elimination of the Tutsi people. This chapter concludes with a review 
of the response of the international community to this violence and an assessment of how 
genocidal rape has been defined in international law as a result of this response. 
Chapter 3 examines the establishment of the gacaca court system and its function as an 
institution of transitional justice. After a summary of the historical evolution of gacaca, I outline 
the objectives that this court system was originally designed to achieve, including both the 
pragmatic goals and the broader, more “profound” goals traditionally associated with transitional 
justice.  
Chapter 4 discusses the decision to move sexual crimes to the jurisdiction of the gacaca 
court in 2008. I outline the reasons for this shift and the adaptations to gacaca law that 
accompanied it, and address why these adaptations were not sufficient to overcome the barriers 
that survivors of sexual violence face when testifying at gacaca. In Chapter 5 I return to the 
social objectives of gacaca, outlined in Chapter 3, in order to analyze the failure of gacaca to 
achieve its stated objectives when it came to survivors of sexual violence.  
 My final chapter proposes an alternative model for providing restorative justice to 
survivors of sexual violence. It is my conclusion that community-based, women-centered 
organizations which focus their resources on addressing the practical financial and medical needs 
of rape survivors and emphasize mental health, social support, and a sense of empowerment are 
more effective at providing “justice” to survivors of sexual violence from the genocide than is 
the Rwandan state system of gacaca.   
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Chapter 2: Sexual Violence as a Weapon of Genocide 
This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death, rape as 
massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an 
instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never want to go back. 
It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape as spectacle. It is 
rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It is 
rape as genocide. 
-Catharine A. MacKinnon (1994, 11-12) 
 
 
Stories of mass rape during warfare predate Roman history, and the connection between 
armed conflict and violence against women has been cemented in the popular imagination so 
thoroughly that countless expressions spring to mind: to “rape and pillage,” Sabine women, the 
Rape of Nanking, “comfort women,” “rape camps.” For centuries wars between men, tribes, 
ethnic groups, and states have been fought on the battlefields of women’s bodies, because the 
rape of enemy women has traditionally been accepted as spoil of war or the “prerogative” of 
conquering soldiers (Reid-Cunningham 2008, 279). The rapes that occurred during the genocides 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, however, garnered international media 
attention due to the widespread and systematic nature in which they were conducted. For the first 
time, legal scholars and historians began to discuss sexual violence not merely as an inevitable 
by-product of war but as a potential weapon. From these discussions emerged the concept of rape 
as a form of genocide, and of “genocidal rape” as distinct from other forms of sexual violence 
committed both within and outside of the context of war.  
In this chapter I examine the sexual violence that occurred within Rwanda between April 
and July of 1994, noting how rape was used intentionally and systematically as one tactic within 
a larger genocidal policy. I follow this overview with a discussion of how this violence was 
understood by the international community and the emergence of a definition of genocidal rape. 
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Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide 
It is impossible to estimate how many Rwandan women were raped or otherwise sexually 
abused during the one hundred days of the genocide. A 2000 report by the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) (2000) summarizes the difficulty this way: 
Since rape was widely regarded as shameful for the victim, it was often enveloped in 
secrecy. As a result, compiling statistical evidence on rape during the genocide is 
difficult. However, there is no question that it was used as a systematic tool…to wipe out 
the Tutsi population. According to testimonies given by survivors, we could conclude 
that practically every female over the age of 12 who survived the genocide was…[a] 
direct [victim] of rape or other sexual violence, or [was] profoundly affected by it…most 
survivors reported the belief that rape was the norm for virtually all women during the 
genocide. (149)  
 
Most estimates for the number of women who were raped during the genocide range from 
250,000 to 500,000 (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 11). Common forms of sexual violence 
in this context included gang-rape, rape with foreign objects (such as sharpened sticks, guns, and 
beer bottles), mutilation of the breasts and genitals, and sexual slavery—both in collective 
settings and through forced marriages. As suggested by the OAU report, the massive scale and 
the extreme brutality of the sexual violence against Tutsi women is strongly indicative of a 
systematic, targeted strategy on the part of the Rwandan government to implement rape as part of 
a larger genocidal policy.6 As described by Anne-Marie de Brouwer and Sandra Ka Hon Chu 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6. Because this thesis focuses on survivors of genocidal rape, my analysis of sexual 
violence in Rwanda will be limited to those who were raped specifically in order to achieve the 
objectives of the genocide: namely, Tutsi women and girls. This limitation is not intended to 
further silence the experiences of other survivors, as serious attention must be paid to providing 
all survivors of sexual violence with the justice that they deserve. It is important to note that 
many men were subjected to sexual violence during the conflict along with moderate Hutu 
women, Hutu women who were married to Tutsi men, and Hutu women who protected Tutsis. 
Moreover, the RPF was responsible for the rapes of many Hutu women, among other atrocities. 
Significantly, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the RPF are not within the 
jurisdiction of gacaca. For more on the exclusion of Hutu survivors of sexual violence from the 
justice system in Rwanda, consult Chiseche Mibenge’s Sex and International Tribunals: The 
Erasure of Gender from the War Narrative, Chapter 2.  
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(2009), “the sexual violence in Rwanda is notorious because of the organized propaganda…the 
very public nature of the rapes and the level of ruthlessness directed towards women” (17). 
Indeed, given the widespread propaganda and the direct and indirect orders to rape from 
authorities during the genocide, it is evident that the génocidaires understood the power of rape 
as an extremely effective method of demoralizing and humiliating the entire Tutsi population and 
intentionally implemented this weapon as part of their genocidal policy. Moreover, they actively 
employed forced impregnation, the destruction of reproductive capacity, the intentional spread of 
HIV/AIDS, and the breaking of cultural and familial ties as tools of a targeted, systematic 
campaign of genocide. These strategies combined to make sexual violence “a coordinated, 
logical, and brutally effective method of prosecuting warfare” in this context (Kruger 2011, 36).  
 
Propaganda 
Hutu propaganda played a decisive role in encouraging and inciting the genocide through 
media sources such as the magazine Kangura and the radio station Radio-Télévision Libre des 
Milles Collines (RTLM). Hassan Ngeze, the Chief Editor of Kangura and co-founder of RTLM, 
was compared in his indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to 
Heinrich Himmler, the chief of propaganda in Nazi Germany (TRIAL 2016).7 Much of the 
propaganda distributed prior to and during the genocide demonstrated a concerted effort to incite 
hatred of and encourage sexual violence toward Tutsi women. Four of the famous “Ten 
Commandments” published in 1990 in Kangura concerned women. The first, for example, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7. Ngeze was sentenced by the ICTR in 2007 for 35 years in prison on the following 
charges: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Though none of these charges included reference to his 
specific encouragement of rape or targeted attacks toward Tutsi women, he is widely known to 
have published materials “constituting slander and persecution against Tutsi women” (TRIAL 
2016).  
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stated: “Every Hutu must know that any Tutsi woman, wherever she is, is working for her Tutsi 
ethnic group” (Ngeze 1990). Propaganda was widely distributed which condemned Tutsi women 
as arrogant, manipulative, seductive, and hypersexual. An essay published in a 1991 issue of 
Kangura stated: 
You find [Tutsi women] everywhere in all the institutions, in the Ministries, in the private 
sector, in…illegal drinking places, as well as in our own houses, which many of them 
have infiltrated through marriage. Having husbands does not prevent them from being 
accomplices and extracting secrets from people using their worldly wiles…As soon as 
they see that they have lost the armed war, [Tutsi leaders] will use their sisters’ bodies as 
well as that of their wives and mothers. (“Editorial,” 1991) 
 
Moreover, pornographic cartoons were widely distributed depicting Tutsi women in sexual 
positions or using their bodies to manipulate Hutu leaders, politicians, and UN peacekeepers. 
The February 1994 issue of Kangura contained a cartoon illustration of the UN Peacekeeper 
Lieutenant-General surrounded by highly sexualized caricatures of Tutsi women with the caption 
“General Dallaire and his army have fallen into the trap of the Tutsi femmes fatales” (“Cartoon,” 
1994) (See Appendix A).  
This sexualization of Tutsi women undoubtedly contributed heavily to creating an 
atmosphere in which “the mass rape of Tutsi women appeared to be an appropriate form of 
retribution for their purported arrogance, immorality, hyper-sexuality, and espionage” (Sarlach 
1999, 394). Propaganda also appealed to ethnic myths about the beauty and social superiority of 
Tutsi women. This tactic proved highly effective in encouraging perpetrators of the genocide to 
commit rape against Tutsi women. One survivor explains, “a man I had refused to date before the 
genocide raped me…. Before he raped me, he said I now had no choice but to accept him” (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 101). Another survivor recalls an Interahamwe soldier saying, 
just before raping her, “remember the past months when you were proud of yourselves and didn't 
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look at us because you felt we were lower than you? Now that will never happen again” (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 114).  
 
Endorsement of and Command to Rape by Authority Figures 
In continuation of this coordinated governmental strategy, military and civilian 
authorities were responsible for directly ordering or indirectly encouraging génocidaires to rape 
Tutsi women. The indictment against Jean Paul Akayesu included the charges that he “facilitated 
the commission of…sexual violence” and “encouraged these activities” (ICTR 1998, 7). 
Akayesu was famously quoted as instructing Interahamwe soldiers (with a laugh): “Never ask 
me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like.”8 In locations such as Taba and Kabgayi, women and 
girls were kept in sexual slavery and raped in communal offices organized by political and 
military authorities. In Kabyagi, a nursing school, “soldiers ordered the directress to give them 
the young women students as umusanzu, a contribution to the war effort” (Des Forges 1999, 
215). 
In addition to direct orders, a tacitly understood “permission” to rape Tutsi women was 
actively employed as a strategy to recruit Interahamwe and other perpetrators of genocide. 
Prunier (1997) explains how many poor or socially disadvantaged members of society took 
advantage of the genocide: “For these people the genocide was the best thing that could ever 
happen to them. They had the blessings of a form of authority to take revenge…They could steal, 
they could kill with minimum justification, they could rape and they could get drunk for free. 
This was wonderful” (232). Permission to rape, especially to rape those women who were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8. This famous quote comes from the testimony of a survivor (code-named J.J.) during 
the trial of Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (ICTR 1998, 109). This testimony helped convict 
Akayesu for genocidal rape, as it was interpreted as an order by Akayesu to the Interahamwe to 
continue raping Tutsi women.  
 15!
considered most beautiful and hardest to attain in society, was just one of many spoils available 
to génocidaires. One survivor notes that her rapist “told [her] that he had never before had the 
opportunity to have sex with Tutsi women, but now they had all become available” (De Brouwer 
and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 115). 
 
Strategies of Genocidal Rape 
Forced impregnation and Loss of Reproductive Freedom   
While many of these “opportunistic” rapes undoubtedly occurred, scholars agree that 
sexual violence during this period was not simply an example of the chaos and lawlessness that 
results from wartime but was also intentionally used as a tactic to further the genocidal objective 
of eliminating the Tutsi ethnic group. Forced impregnation was one of the key strategies utilized 
by génocidaires in this campaign. As with most statistics generated from the genocide, is it 
difficult to estimate the number of children born to Tutsi women as a result of rape (known as 
enfants mauvais souvenir, or “children of bad memory”) during this period; according to de 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu (2009) this number could range anywhere between two and fifteen 
thousand (145). Without dispute, these forced pregnancies have had a huge impact on Rwandan 
life long past the genocide, and caring for this population remains a devastating and difficult 
challenge both for survivors and for the Rwandan government.  
Fathering children from forced pregnancies was among the primary reasons that 
génocidaires utilized a strategy of genocidal rape. Because Rwandan lineage, and therefore 
ethnicity, has traditionally been determined patrilineally, the children born of these rapes would 
be considered Hutu (Penal Reform International 2002, 44). Furthermore, many survivors of 
sexual assault who found themselves pregnant underwent illegal and dangerous abortions, 
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resulting in death or infertility (Morris 2014, 23). A report from the OAU (2002) claimed that 
“many women require treatment for serious complications due to self-induced or clandestine 
abortions due to rape-related pregnancies” (150). 
In fact, the destruction of the reproductive capacities of Tutsi women was another 
intentional consequence of the sexual violence directed toward them. Infertility among women as 
a result of unsafe abortions or injuries sustained during sexual assault remains widespread in 
Rwanda. Rape with foreign objects and the mutilation of women’s sexual organs with “acid, 
boiling water, and machetes” (Kruger 2011, 7) were extremely common during the genocide, and 
many women who were violently raped remain unable to conceive children as a result of damage 
to their reproductive organs, scar tissue, fistulas, and internal bleeding. Moreover, emotional 
trauma has made it extremely difficult for some women to conceive children, and social stigma 
against rape makes it difficult for them to remarry. By physically denying many Tutsi women the 
ability to reproduce, perpetrators of sexual violence during the genocide have achieved their goal 
of reducing the Tutsi population in Rwanda for generations. Thus, in a strange paradox, 
genocidal rape in Rwanda served the dual purpose of limiting the amount of Tutsi children born, 
both during and after the genocide, while at the same time increasing the amount of Hutu 
children born during this period through forced impregnation.  
 
The Intentional Spread of HIV/AIDS 
According to Amnesty International (2004), approximately seventy percent of survivors 
of sexual violence committed during the Rwandan genocide are HIV positive (3). This 
staggering figure is the result of an intentional, concerted effort to infect Tutsi women with 
HIV/AIDS. Special Interahamwe units were formed which consisted exclusively of HIV-positive 
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men whose duty it was to spread HIV/AIDS to as much of the Tutsi population as possible. As 
President Paul Kagame stated in an interview “the government was bringing AIDS patients out 
of the hospitals specifically to form battalions of rapists,” (Landesman 2002). This claim was 
supported by the 2000 report from the OAU report previously mentioned (148). 
Countless testimonies from survivors of rape during the genocide confirm that the 
transmission of HIV to their victims was indeed intentional. One survivor remembers,  
One of the gendarmes was seriously ill, you could see that he had AIDS, his face was 
covered with spots, his lips were red, almost burned, he had abscesses on his neck. Then 
he told me ‘take a good look at me and remember what I look like. I could kill you right 
now but I don’t feel like wasting my bullet. I want you to die slowly like me. 
(Nduwimana 2004, 18) 
 
Other survivors “have stated that their perpetrators told them that they would not kill them 
immediately, but that a slow, painful death was awaiting them in the form of HIV/AIDS” 
(Kruger 2011, 43). 
HIV infection was seen as a “triply effective weapon” in the genocidal campaign, 
because once a Tutsi woman was infected with HIV, she became “a potential source of 
contamination to her future partners, supposedly Tutsi; she would give birth to children who 
would have very limited chances of survival; and she would finally die, bringing several others 
with her” (Nduwimana 2004, 18). Because of this strategy, HIV has been described as “the 
legacy left to women raped during the genocide” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 146), and 
the effects of this legacy are among the longest lasting and most pervasive consequences of the 
genocide on Rwandan women’s daily life.  
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Demoralization and the Destruction of Cultural Bonds  
 While many of the “strategies” of genocidal rape worked directly to kill Tutsi women or 
inhibit their ability to reproduce, the functions of genocidal rape go beyond killing and can also 
serve to destabilize or destroy specific ethnic groups (Reid-Cunningham 2008, 281). In societies 
where women hold essential roles in community and family structures, genocidal rape is 
intended to weaken “the very fabric of society” (Kruger 2011, 37). Because familial and cultural 
ties are cemented around women’s roles as wives and mothers, genocidal rape is “meant to 
degrade not just the individual woman but also to strip the humanity from the larger group of 
which she is a part. The rape of one person is translated into an assault upon the community 
through the emphasis placed…on women’s sexual virtue” (Nowrojee 1996, 1-2). 
When utilized this way, the intended targets of genocidal rape are indeed the men in the 
community, both because the men are viewed as “responsible” for protecting the women (Kruger 
2011, 39) and because the rape of a Tutsi woman “robs the husband of his control over his wife’s 
sexuality,” leaving the men “emasculated…and therefore dehumanized, rendered powerless” 
(Reid-Cunningham 2008, 291). In the logic of genocidal rape, “a raped woman’s body is 
evidence of an attack on her people” (Kruger 2011, 39). 
 In addition to degrading and demoralizing the entire Tutsi population in order to facilitate 
their elimination in the immediate sense, rape was also intended to destroy the social and cultural 
bonds of Tutsi families and communities in the longer term. Because of the social stigma 
surrounding rape in Rwanda, many survivors were abandoned by their husbands and/or rejected 
by their communities. Many women were unable to form bonds with the children they had 
birthed as a result of forced impregnation; one woman says of her daughter, “I hated her, because 
she was a constant reminder of what had happened to me” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 
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122). Because of the vital position of women in Rwandan families and communities through 
their roles as wives and mothers, these consequences which affect women’s ability to participate 
in their communities or care for their children inevitably led to “the deterioration of the familial 
structures…[and] the social structures of the community” (Reid-Cunningham 2008, 292). 
 Because perpetrators knew the social consequences that sexual violence would have for 
families and communities, rapes were often conducted in public places to make them more 
difficult for survivors to conceal. Catharine MacKinnon describes genocidal rape as “rape to be 
seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge 
through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people” (MacKinnon 1994, 11-12). 
During the Rwandan genocide, women were frequently raped in public places or forced to march 
naked through their communities. One survivor notes that she was gang raped “during the 
daytime, in front of the bar. Many Interahamwe were watching, dancing and laughing at me” (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 102). In addition to their genocidal functions described earlier, 
forced pregnancies, genital and breast mutilation, HIV infection, and infertility rendered rape 
even more visible and prevented women from remarrying or reintegrating into their communities 
after the genocide. 
Because so many of these rapes occurred in public, many witnesses can also be 
considered “secondary victims” (Kruger 2011, 41). One survivor remembers that while she was 
being raped in a public space “one of the Interahamwe decided to call my father and force him to 
see what was happening to me” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 60). A 2000 survey found 
that 31 percent of Rwandan children had witnessed rape or sexual assault during the genocide 
(Kruger 2011, 7). Indeed, rape was so visible during this time that it became “generalized to the 
whole population as survivors, witnesses, families, and communities internalize[d] rape as an 
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assault on their collective consciousness” (Reid-Cunningham 2008, 279). 
 
The Emergence of Rape as Genocide in International Law 
 After centuries of indifference concerning wartime rape on the part of the international 
legal community, the genocides in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s fundamentally reshaped 
the international discourse surrounding this matter. The Western world had watched, transfixed, 
as the extreme brutality of the conflict in Yugoslavia was broadcasted directly to their living 
rooms. Detailed accounts of the mass rapes occurring in the Balkans were being widely 
publicized throughout the global community by August of 1992 (Crider 2012, 26). By the time 
media sources began publishing stories about the mass rapes in Rwanda in 1995, the global 
community had already begun to take notice of the systematic and widespread sexual violence 
happening in conjunction with these genocides.9 With women from both genocides speaking 
publicly to media sources about their experiences of rape, it soon became evident that these 
experiences were fundamentally different than those of many other victims of rape during armed 
conflict. As Erica Feller, director of the Department of International Protection of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), stated in 1999: “The invisibility of women 
and sexual violence ended with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This war, and the genocide 
in Rwanda, made it all too clear that rape and sexual violence, far from being isolated acts, are 
more and more frequently used as strategic weapons of war” (Crider 2012, 26). 
 A precedent in international law prohibiting wartime rape had existed prior to these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9. It is worth noting that the first publication about mass rape in Rwanda by a mainstream 
media source was not published until 1995. The failure of Western media to initially report the 
Rwandan genocide has been well documented, prompting scholars such as Allan Thompson 
(2007) to claim that “more informed and comprehensive coverage of the Rwanda 
genocide…might well have mitigated or even halted the killing by sparking an international 
outcry” (3).  
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conflicts. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, published in 1949, states that within the 
context of war “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in 
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.” However, before 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993, and its sister 
tribunal in Rwanda in November 1994, rape had never been tried as a war crime. Thus, both 
tribunals made history by including rape within their charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity from the outset (Crider 2012, 29), eventually specifically classifying the rapes that 
occurred in Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a form of genocide.  
Article II of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
provides the basis for the definition of genocide in international law. This article states that:  
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (280) 
 
Using this definition, the ICTR was able to sentence Jean Paul Akayesu in the first-ever 
international war crimes trial to convict a defendant for genocide. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul 
Akayesu was a landmark decision both for the ICTR and for the entire international legal 
community in the pursuance of justice for victims of genocide. Importantly, the Akayesu ruling 
explicitly defined the systematic rape that occurred during this period as a crime of genocide. 
According to the Fourth Annual Report for the ICTR: 
The Trial Chamber held that rape…and sexual assault constitute acts of genocide insofar 
as they were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted group, as 
such. It found that sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the 
Tutsi ethnic group and that the rape was systematic and had been perpetrated against 
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Tutsi women only, manifesting the specific intent required for those acts to constitute 
genocide. (6) 
 
This ruling explicitly links genocidal intent—“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a targeted 
group”—with the sexual violence committed against Tutsi women between April and July of 
1994. Thus, the Akayesu decision cemented a legal precedent to which all female Tutsi survivors 
of sexual violence during the genocide have a claim.  
Unfortunately, this precedent was not translated into justice for the majority of Rwandan 
women who brought their rape cases to the ICTR. Within the tribunal,  
in the 30 per cent [of adjudicated cases] that included rape charges, only 10 per cent were 
found guilty for their role in the widespread sexual violence...20 per cent, were acquitted 
because the court found that the prosecutor did not properly present the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In real numbers, that means that, at the tenth anniversary of the 
genocide, only two defendants had specifically been held responsible for their role in 
sexual violence crimes, despite tens of thousands of rapes committed during the 
genocide. (Nowrojee 2005, 3) 
 
This summary of the failure of the ICTR to convict rape cases is startling. However, these 
numbers do not even include the thousands of rape survivors who were waiting for their cases to 
be processed in the extremely backlogged Rwandan national court system (to say nothing of the 
tens of thousands of survivors who have never sought formal criminal justice). Though the 
precedents being set by the ICTR were groundbreaking, it was obvious that it would be 
unfeasible to rely on the tribunal and the Rwandan courts alone to provide justice to genocide 
survivors. The next chapter will trace the development of Rwanda’s unique solution to this 
problem: the revival of the gacaca court system.  
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Chapter 3: The Gacaca Court System as an Institution of Transitional Justice 
 As Rwanda emerged from the genocide, its new government had to face the task of 
rebuilding a nation mired in political upheaval, economic stagnation, crippling poverty, and 
some of the most pronounced physical and mental health epidemics in the world. Prior to the 
genocide, the population of Rwanda was approximately seven million; by August 1994 as many 
as a million people had been murdered and nearly two million additional civilians, government 
officials, and soldiers had fled to neighboring countries (Prunier 1997, 312). The destruction of 
the nation’s administration and infrastructure was “virtually unparalleled in human history” 
(Wells 2005, 181). Though the ICTR had been established by November 1994, and a Special 
Chamber of the Rwandan Supreme Court was established in 1996, it quickly became apparent 
that these two legal institutions alone would not be able to provide the type of justice required for 
the nation to move forward. What was needed was a holistic approach to justice, “aiming to 
rebuild individual and communal lives and to contribute to reconstruction in both the short and 
the long term” (Clark 2010, 32).  
 In effect, Rwanda needed a transitional justice system. Transitional justice programs 
typically combine a variety of mechanisms such as war crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation 
commissions, institutional reforms, and reparations programs in an attempt to reconstruct 
societies that have been affected by political violence, civil war, or widespread human rights 
abuses. Due to the specific needs of such societies, transitional justice programs are intended to 
address both the practical needs that any nation faces following armed conflict (i.e., prosecuting 
criminals and rebuilding infrastructure) as well as the more subtle socio-cultural goals of 
promoting truth, healing, and restorative justice. In the case of Rwanda, nearly every member of 
the nation’s civilian population was directly involved in the genocide, and communities were 
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destroyed as citizens killed their neighbors and family members. Most people did not have guns 
and therefore killed with machetes, blunt objects, or by beating people to death. Sexual violence 
was both normalized and extremely brutal in nature. In such circumstances, where killing was 
widespread, highly physical, and extremely personal, the trauma of survivors and perpetrators 
alike goes beyond the practical problems caused by other kinds of warfare. Moreover, because 
Hutu and Tutsi people were so integrated within society and many people were too poor to leave 
their communities following the genocide, survivors were forced to continue living alongside 
their rapists and the people who had killed their family members. In addition to trying criminals, 
the transitional justice system established after the genocide therefore needed to address broader, 
more profound objectives specifically designed to heal the society and help people live together 
again. 
Thus, the decision to turn to gacaca as an institution of transitional justice was shaped by 
Rwanda’s need to address a multitude of pragmatic and profound objectives, ranging from 
reducing prison overcrowding to providing restorative justice to survivors. This chapter will 
discuss the process of reviving this pre-colonial tradition into a modern, standardized judicial 
system, followed by an outline of the objectives that this system was designed to achieve.  
 
Reviving the Gacaca Courts 
Gacaca, derived from the Kinyarwanda word for grass, was a traditional method of 
conflict resolution in pre-colonial Rwanda (Clark 2010, 3). Traditional gacaca hearings were 
community gatherings, held outdoors and led by the male heads of households, meant to address 
minor conflicts that arose within or between families, such as issues of “land use, livestock, 
damage to property, marriage or inheritance” (Clark 2010, 52). Community members brought 
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grievances to respected elders, who allowed the defendants to respond to the charges brought 
against them and pass judgment based on the evidence heard. Gacaca hearings usually followed 
a well-established pattern wherein defendants would “confess their crimes, express remorse and 
ask for forgiveness from those whom they had injured. Gacaca judges would then demand that 
confessors provide restitution to their victims, and the process would culminate in the sharing of 
beer, wine or food…to symbolise the reconciliation of the parties involved” (Clark 2010, 53). By 
the twentieth century, gacaca was considered “the main method of ensuring social order in 
communities across Rwanda” (Clark 2010, 52). Variations of gacaca continued to exist under 
and after colonialism, shifting several times in form and function, but the system was never 
enshrined into written law. 
As early as 1995, the Rwandan government and the UN had begun discussing 
restructuring gacaca as a potential solution for addressing the complex needs of post-genocide 
Rwandan society (Clark 2010, 55). The Rwandan President established a commission in 1998 
“to investigate the possibility of restructuring gacaca into a system appropriate for handling 
genocide cases” (Clark 2010, 57), and after years of “protracted and often heated” debates and an 
extensive survey of the perceptions of the Rwandan population, the government determined that 
a restructured, institutionalized judicial system based on the customary practice of gacaca was 
the solution (Clark 2010, 57-63).  
Organic Law 40/2000, referred to hereafter as the Gacaca Law, established the new 
gacaca system in 2001. After a series of “trial runs,” assessments, and modifications, gacaca was 
extended to a large portion of Rwandan society by 2002 (Clark 2010, 69), and instituted 
nationwide by 2005 (Haskell 2011, 17). In its modern form, gacaca is a system of community-
based justice which tries accused perpetrators of genocide within their own neighborhoods, 
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based on their confessions and the testimony of community members. Gacaca trials are judged 
by inyangamugayo, local leaders elected by citizens for their “standing in the community, their 
dedication to the well-being of their neighbours and for their love of truth and justice” (Clark 
2010, 67). Under the gacaca system, many suspected génocidaires were provisionally released 
from prison and sent to educational camps, known as ingando, devoted to the rehabilitation of 
recently released prisoners through sensitivity training, community service, and civic education. 
Ingando participants were taught the logistics of the gacaca process as well as how to “return to 
their communities and spread the government’s message that there was no place in Rwandan 
society for the ethnic divisions of the past” (Clark 2010, 106). After ingando, the prisoners were 
allowed to return to their communities to await their trials at gacaca.  
In gacaca, Inyangamugayo determine punishments according to a set of regulations based 
on confession and plea-bargaining, in which suspects can reduce their sentence by at least half by 
confessing their crimes (Clark 2010, 77). Most gacaca sentences combine reduced prison terms 
with community service in the form of post-genocide reconstruction efforts, ranging from 
building roads to rebuilding houses for genocide survivors. Because of these lightened sentences 
and the informal nature of gacaca trials, the government is able to process cases much more 
rapidly than if all suspected génocidaires were sentenced through the ICTR or the Rwandan 
national courts.  
 
Objectives of Gacaca 
When announcing the official launch of the gacaca system in 2002, Rwandan President 
Paul Kagame stated that the five core objectives of gacaca were to: 
- Reveal the truth about what happened; 
- Accelerate genocide trials; 
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- Eradicate the culture of impunity; 
- Reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity; and 
- Prove that Rwanda has the capacity to resolve its own problems. (Haskell 2011, 
16) 
 
The 2001 Gacaca Law itself promotes similar objectives, aiming to!
eradicate for ever the culture of impunity in order to achieve justice and reconciliation in 
Rwanda, and thus to adopt provisions enabling rapid prosecutions and trials of 
perpetrators and accomplices of genocide, not only with the aim of providing 
punishment, but also reconstituting the Rwandan Society that had been destroyed by bad 
leaders who incited the population into exterminating part of the Society. (Republic of 
Rwanda 2004, 3)10 
 
Thus, from the outset gacaca was conscience of a wide variety of objectives. By understanding 
the goals that gacaca was intended to achieve, we will be able to examine the ways in which 
these goals were subverted for survivors of sexual violence.  
 
Accelerating Genocide Trials and Reducing Prison Overcrowding 
The most immediate problem that the post-genocide Rwandan government needed to 
address was the massive overcrowding in the nation’s prisons. According to Haskell (2011), by 
October 1994, an estimated 58,000 Rwandans were being detained in prison space intended for 
only 12,000, and within just four years this number grew to approximately 130,000 (13). 
Virtually no system existed to deal with this backlog, as Rwanda’s justice system had been 
under-resourced even before 1994 (Haskell 2011, 13) and “most of Rwanda’s judges and lawyers 
had been killed and the judicial infrastructure was decimated” during the genocide (Clark 2010, 
20). According to a 2008 Human Rights Watch report, “extreme overcrowding and lack of 
sanitation, food, and medical care created conditions that were universally acknowledged to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10. This quote is extracted from the Revised Gacaca Law of 2004, rather than the original 
2001 Gacaca Law, only because the English translation is more clear. The wording of the 
Kinyarwanda in both laws is the same.  
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inhumane and which claimed thousands of lives” (Haskell 2011, 13-14). By 1998, a mere 1,292 
people had been tried in the conventional courts, and it was estimated that it would take 
approximately 200 years to try all of the genocide cases at this rate (Haskell 2011, 15). Because 
gacaca allowed for the provisional release of prisoners and the informal structure of gacaca trials 
was able to process cases more quickly than conventional courts, implementing gacaca would 
accelerate the sentencing of suspected génocidaires and reduce the population of the prisons 
dramatically.  
 
Reducing Poverty  
When considering the societal problems that gacaca needed to address, the government 
understood that “attention to poverty alleviation would minimize social unrest and help ensure a 
lasting peaceful environment in the country” (Clark 2010, 177). By 1998, the Rwandan state was 
spending $20 million per year to support the prison population, funding that the country 
desperately needed elsewhere (Haskell 2011, 14). 81.9% of a sample of Rwandans cited poverty 
and economic hardship as Rwanda’s “major social problem after the genocide,” (Clark 2010, 
176),  and much of this economic hardship was directly linked to the genocide due to the massive 
percentage of the workforce lost to violence or imprisonment. Additionally, many community 
members were forced to support their family members in prison because “the government was 
unable to adequately provide food and clothing for detainees” (Clark 2010, 100).  
The government argued that releasing detainees through the gacaca system would foster 
economic growth by returning tens of thousands able-bodied men to the workforce and by 
reducing the costs of prison maintenance (Clark 2010, 177). Moreover, under gacaca’s system of 
community service as punishment for genocide crimes, prisoners assisted in rebuilding national 
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infrastructure as well as rebuilding homes for survivors, reducing both the national debt and the 
economic burden of survivors. A 2009 UN report claimed that in four years gacaca had 
“produced 14 billion Rwandan francs’ worth of labour for the post-genocide reconstruction of 
the country” (Clark 2010, 178).  
 
Establishing a “Rwandan” Model of Justice 
Since the genocide, the Rwandan government has actively reinforced the historical 
narrative that the ethnic tensions in Rwanda resulted from the damaging influence of colonialism 
as part of their strategy of to unify Rwanda. The nation’s colonial history and the experiences of 
the Hutu Republic have “contributed to a population that is both highly dependent on and deeply 
fearful of hierarchy and state control” (Wells 2005, 178). Moreover, the international community 
famously abandoned Rwanda in 1994, and many Rwandans still resent Western policymakers 
and the UN for failing to act to prevent or halt the genocide. Given this context, one of the 
primary objectives of returning to the pre-colonial tradition of gacaca was to “enable 
communities to solve their problems in a manner consistent with Rwandan culture” (Wells 2005, 
176). The community-oriented nature of gacaca provides an alternate model of justice from the 
Western-based, top-down ICTR or the national courts. To this end, the Executive Secretary of 
Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) Fatuma Ndangiza described 
gacaca as “a form of justice originating from and serving Rwandan culture” as well as a 
demonstration of “Rwandans’ ability to manage their [own] conflicts” (Clark 2010, 134). This 
also explains why Kagame listed “[proving] that Rwanda has the capacity to resolve its own 
problems” as one of the primary objectives of gacaca (Haskell 2011, 16). This sentiment is 
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echoed by civilians and participants in gacaca; one survivor stated that she had faith in the 
gacaca process because it was how “Rwandans have always done it” (Amick 2011, 73). 
 
Individualizing Guilt and Curbing the Desire for Revenge  
 One of the fundamental benefits of holding criminal trials after genocide is that they 
“make the statement that specific individuals—not entire ethnic or religious or political groups—
committed atrocities for which they need to be held accountable” (Kritz 1997, 128). This is 
especially important in Rwanda to counteract the idea that all Hutu participated in the genocide, 
an assumption that has, according to Des Forges (1999),  “become increasingly common among 
both Rwandans and outsiders” (763). By holding individuals responsible for atrocities and 
providing survivors with a sense of justice, criminal trials inherently curb the desire for revenge 
and “mitigate the resumption of violence by preventing mass reprisals or revenge killings,” 
necessary for maintaining lasting peace after a conflict (Mendeloff 2004, 359).  
 
Truth 
The first of the “five core objectives” of gacaca, according to President Kagame, was to 
“reveal the truth about what happened” (Haskell 2011, 16). Burt Ingelaere (2009) even goes so 
far as to argue that “the ‘surfacing of the truth’…is the cornerstone of the entire transitional 
justice framework in post-genocide Rwanda” (509). Indeed, by providing a space for witnesses 
and suspects alike to have their stories heard, gacaca serves as an important forum for truth-
telling. In recognizing that “truth” was a primary objective of gacaca, and examining the benefits 
behind truth-telling for rebuilding post-conflict societies, I will be able to explore in Chapter 5 
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the ways in which each of these benefits was subverted under the gacaca system for survivors of 
sexual violence. 
Without truth, it is impossible to establish an official historical narrative about a conflict. 
Survivors must tell the truth about their experiences if perpetrators are to be assigned blame and 
punished for their actions. The Rwandan government argues that gacaca is particularly well 
suited to achieve this objective because the testimony comes directly from the general 
population. Phil Clark (2010) summarizes this argument by emphasizing the assumption that  
because genocide crimes were often committed in full view of the community…the 
population will know who committed these crimes and how they were perpetrated…the 
population not only knows better than anyone else what happened during the genocide 
but gacaca allows more people to tell their truth than is possible in other judicial 
institutions. (190)  
 
Establishing an official record has had the added benefit of providing closure for those 
survivors who do not know what happened to their families during the genocide. One survivor 
appreciates that gacaca “help[s] genocide survivors learn what had happened to their loved ones 
and where their bodies lay, so that they could receive a proper burial” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon 
Chu 2009, 122). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that repressing the truth may lead to 
future violence in post-conflict societies. One Tutsi returnee expressed fear that without an 
opportunity to hear and tell the truth about their experiences during the genocide, “the people are 
closed up and could explode again in the future” (Lambourne 2001, 327).  Mendeloff (2004) 
argues that truth-telling prevents a resumption of violence by allowing post-conflict societies to 
develop a shared history, learn from the mistakes of the past, and create a common dialogue 
about human rights (360). 
Moreover, truth-telling is frequently considered therapeutic for survivors and a 
prerequisite for individual healing and societal reconciliation. According to Michael Scharf 
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(1997), establishing the truth of a conflict “acknowledg[es] the suffering of victims and their 
families…and allow[s] victims to tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire 
country, and imparting to the citizenry a sense of dignity and empowerment that could help them 
move beyond the pain of the past” (379). This healing” function of truth-telling is “one of the 
primary claims” of much transitional justice scholarship (Mendeloff 2004, 359), and was 
recognized within the official discourse of the Rwandan government as one of the objectives of 
gacaca (Clark, 1919). Thus, from the outset, gacaca was established as a forum to expose the 
truth of what happened during the genocide, and this objective was closely tied to the further 
objectives of healing, reconciliation, and justice. 
 
Justice 
  Wendy Lambourne (2001) claims that “the need for justice is a strong motivating force 
in human life” (312), and justice is, accordingly, the “theme most readily identified as an 
objective of gacaca” (Clark 2010, 237). Justice is, however, an extraordinarily complex concept, 
and much like the other objectives of gacaca, definitions of justice vary widely and range from 
pragmatic to profound. Punitive (also known as retributive) justice is concerned with fairness, 
and aims to punish perpetrators because it is what they “deserve” (Clark 2010, 38). This form of 
justice is often powerful for survivors, as punishing criminals can “offer victims the opportunity 
to affirm the ‘wrongness’ of the crime committed against them” (Amick 2011, 73).  
Moreover, punitive justice is linked to deterrent justice, the idea that “punishment is 
necessary, not simply because perpetrators deserve it but because it should help discourage a 
convicted perpetrator from committing another crime, for fear of receiving punishment” (Clark 
2010, 38). In the official rhetoric of the Rwandan government, this objective has been referred to 
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as “eradicat[ing] the culture of impunity” and was emphasized as a primary goal of gacaca from 
the outset (Haskell 2011, 16). In Rwanda, this culture of impunity has been considered a 
fundamental cause of the genocide (Clark 2010, 35-36). No one was held accountable for the 
mass murders of Tutsi civilians that took place under the Habyarimana regime in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, “fostering a sense that violence for political ends was ‘normal’” (Des Forges 
1999, 4). Scholars agree that this lack of punishment “afforded license to those who planned, 
incited and perpetrated the genocide in 1994” (Clark 2010, 19). Deterrent justice has therefore 
been identified as a crucial objective of gacaca from the outset.  
While punitive and deterrent forms of justice focus on the punishment of perpetrators, 
distributive justice is concerned less with the perpetrator and more with providing support to 
survivors. The international legal community, transitional justice scholars, and survivors alike 
have expressed frustration with offender-oriented models of justice in which the focus of legal 
outcomes is on “what happens to the offender, rather than what happens to the victim” (Herman, 
2003, 162). Thus, reparations are hailed as a vital component of transitional justice programs 
because they are the “most victim-centred justice mechanism available” (United Nations 2011, 
8). Within transitional justice programs, reparations promote interpersonal trust between 
survivors and perpetrators as well as trust in the legitimacy of the new, post-conflict government 
(Rubio-Marin 2006, 25). Accordingly, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2005 
detailing the necessity of reparations for those who have suffered human rights abuses or 
violations of international law. This type of justice is especially relevant in the Rwandan context, 
as poverty and health concerns are often the most salient lasting effects of the genocide for 
survivors. To this end, Article 90 of the original Gacaca Law (2001) held gacaca responsible for 
compiling lists of damages suffered by survivors during the genocide and forwarding these lists 
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to the Compensation Fund for Victims of the Genocide and Crimes against humanity, who would 
then award reparations (30). 
 Thus, punitive, deterrent, and distributive forms of justice were all stated objectives of 
gacaca. These forms of justice, moreover, are precursors to the most profound objective of 
gacaca: restorative justice. Rather than simply punishing criminals or providing reparations to 
survivors, restorative justice focuses on restoring broken community ties and promoting 
reconciliation, “based on [the] recognition of the humanity of both offender and victim” 
(Lambourne 2001, 313). According to Gilbert and Settles (2007), “restorative justice views 
crime as a harm to individuals, their neighborhoods, the surrounding community, and even the 
offender…Under this restorative perspective, justice is not based on punishment inflicted but the 
extent to which harms have been repaired and future harms prevented” (7). Restorative justice 
therefore incorporates many of the aims of transitional justice and is often seen as the “ultimate 
objective” of transitional justice (Clark 2010, 38).  
Gacaca was designed to provide restorative justice in several ways. It was assumed that 
the popular participation of gacaca would “encourage dialogue and collaboration” between 
survivors and perpetrators, which would help to “rebuild trust and relationships between 
previously antagonistic parties” (Clark 2010, 238). Gacaca also accelerated the reintegration of 
perpetrators into their communities by requiring them to serve their communities and/or 
participate in communal work programs (Clark 2010, 238-239). Restorative justice was therefore 
a primary objective of the Rwandan government when establishing gacaca; as stated by the 
Gacaca Law (2001) itself, gacaca was designed to “achieve reconciliation and justice in 
Rwanda…without only aiming for simple punishment, but also for the reconstitution of 
Rwandese society” (2). 
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Chapter 4: Survivors of Sexual Violence within the Gacaca System  
With these objectives in mind, gacaca went into effect throughout Rwanda in 2001 to try 
murders and property crimes committed during the genocide. The original objectives, however, 
were not designed with survivors of sexual violence in mind, as the original Gacaca Law of 2001 
did not place sexual crimes under the jurisdiction of the gacaca courts. This chapter will explore 
the decision to include these crimes under the jurisdiction of gacaca and the barriers that 
survivors of sexual violence have faced when attempting to access justice through this system.  
 
Transferring Sexual Crimes to Gacaca 
 Organic Law No. 08/1996 of Rwanda was passed in 1996, separating genocide crimes 
and crimes against humanity into four distinct categories for the purposes of prosecuting the 
crimes committed during the genocide (Republic of Rwanda 1996). Under this law, the Category 
1 was reserved for the crimes considered the most serious. Category 1 offenders included: 
a)…planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or 
of a crime against humanity;  
b) persons who acted in positions of authority…[who] fostered such crimes;  
c) notorious murderers who by the virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they 
committed atrocities, distinguished themselves…; 
d) persons who committed acts [of] sexual torture. (1) 
 
The lower categories of 2, 3, and 4 contained non-sexual crimes including homicide, “serious 
assault,” and property crimes. The 2001 Gacaca Law adopted these same categories, determining 
that Category 1 offenses were to be referred to the Rwandan national court system or to the 
ICTR, while crimes in Categories 2, 3, and 4 would be placed within the jurisdiction of the 
gacaca courts (Republic of Rwanda 2001, 18).   
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 As a result, sexual crimes were considered distinct from other genocide crimes starting in 
1996. This categorization was the result of the efforts of women’s rights activists who argued 
that placing rape in Category 1 “would accurately recognize…sexual violence as among the most 
serious of genocide-related offences, subject to the harshest penalties available” (Wells 2005, 
184). Considering the manner in which sexual violence has been historically understood as a 
“spoil of war,” placing these crimes in the highest category made sense to those wishing to 
recognize the systematic use of rape as a weapon during the Rwandan genocide. In practice, 
however, this decision resulted in very few cases of sexual violence being prosecuted at any 
level. Despite the landmark Akayesu decision, by 2005 “an overwhelming 90 per cent of those 
judgments [handed down by the ICTR] contained no rape convictions…there were double the 
number of acquittals for rape than there were rape convictions” (Nowrojee 2005, iv). Binaifer 
Nowrojee (2005) argues that at the level of the ICTR, prosecuting sexual violence was an 
“afterthought,” and blames the low rate of sexual violence crimes prosecuted by the ICTR on “a 
lack of political will…to integrate sexual violence crimes into a consistently followed 
prosecution strategy…[and on] inadequate investigations, the use of inappropriate investigating 
methodology, and a lack of training for staff” (iv). 
Even when sexual cases have been brought before the tribunal, witnesses have faced 
serious obstacles to testifying. Survivors wishing to testify at the ICTR must to travel to 
Tanzania, potentially losing earnings or leaving young children behind to travel great distances. 
These trials have been characterized by aggressive and excessive cross-examination, 
scrutinization of witnesses’ sexual history, and victim-blaming lines of questioning, and have 
created a hostile environment in which survivors have been humiliated, intimidated, undermined, 
and re-traumatized. In one shocking example, a defense attorney at the ICTR implied that a 
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witness could not have been raped because she smelled bad, resulting in laughter from the judges 
and the entire courtroom (Nowrojee 2005, 17). Moreover, despite being promised anonymity and 
witness protection, many witnesses have been exposed to their communities as survivors of 
sexual violence, frequently resulting in rejection and even violence (Nowrojee 2005, v). 
The National Courts of Rwanda did not fare much better in prosecuting sexual crimes. 
Emily Amick (2011) argues that placing sexual crimes under the jurisdiction of the Rwandan 
courts actually “impeded access to justice for victims” (4). Because the national courts were 
charged with thousands of Category 1 cases, including the prosecution of organizers of the 
genocide and those who had used their positions of authority to incite genocide, sexual violence 
cases were treated as lower priority within the “triage” of the national court system (Amick 2011, 
3). Additionally, witnesses had to travel considerable distances at their own expenses and pay 
court fees to bring their cases to trial (Amick 2011, 53). Though hundreds of thousands of the 
prisoners being held in the national prisons had committed rape, the Association of Genocide 
Widows AVEGA AGAHOZO (hereafter referred to as AVEGA) estimated that the national 
courts processed less than 100 genocide rape cases before 2001 (Amick 2011, 43).  
Between the ICTR and the Rwandan courts, cases of sexual violence were simply not 
being heard. In an attempt to expedite these cases, the Rwandan government turned, once again, 
to gacaca. In May 2008, Parliament passed Organic Law 13/2008, which moved all Category 1 
offenses to the jurisdiction of gacaca, with the exception of organizers of the genocide and 
suspects who occupied government positions at the prefecture level or higher (Republic of 
Rwanda 2008). Ninety percent of the cases transferred to gacaca at this time involved sexual 
violence (Haskell 2011, 113). Between 2008 and 2010, 6,608 cases of sexual violence were tried 
through the gacaca system (Morris 2014, 36). 
 38!
 While the decision to utilize gacaca to try genocide crimes was motivated by a range of 
pragmatic, economic, legal, and social objectives, the decision to include sexual crimes within its 
jurisdiction was driven almost exclusively by the desire to expedite genocide trials. The Attorney 
General of Rwanda himself, Tharcisse Karugarama, stated that the “primary motive [of 
transferring sexual crimes to gacaca was]…to enable us deal with the bulk of genocide cases that 
still remain unresolved till now” (Amick 2011, 35). Though the 2008 Gacaca Law adapted 
certain procedures for hearing the cases of sexual violence, the fundamental objectives which 
gacaca was designed to achieve were not reexamined. As a result, the gacaca system did not 
consider the specific needs of rape survivors, the barriers to testifying that they might face, or the 
ways in which the social or profound goals of gacaca might manifest themselves differently for 
survivors of sexual violence than for other witnesses.  
 
Barriers to Testifying at Gacaca for Survivors of Sexual Violence 
 The public nature of gacaca trials makes it difficult for any survivor of the genocide to 
speak about their experiences. Men and women alike fear that their testimony will not be 
believed, that testifying will renew conflicts with their neighbors, or that they will face 
intimidation or violence. Strict laws prohibiting perjury, slander, “genocide ideology,” and 
“minimizing the genocide” have prevented witnesses from testifying for fear of facing charges 
themselves (Haskell 2011, 86-94). A 2006 study conducted by Karen Brounéus confirmed, 
“survivors who have witnessed in the gacaca have significantly higher levels of depression…and 
PTSD…than survivors who have not witnessed” (Brounéus 2010, 421). There are, however, 
additional barriers that only survivors of sexual violence face, or which they face to a greater 
extent, preventing gacaca from functioning equally well in all cases.  
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Stigma and Victim Blaming 
 As it is all over the world, sexual violence is highly stigmatized in Rwanda. Due to the 
“conservative social and cultural climate of Rwanda,” it is difficult for women to testify about 
the sexual abuses they suffered during the genocide (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 19). 
Unlike other genocide survivors, female survivors of sexual violence “fear that testifying…will 
lead to community ostracism, ineligibility to marry and other secondary harms not similarly 
associated with the disclosure of non-sexual wartime assaults” (Wells 2005, 187). Survivors of 
sexual violence are frequently abandoned by their husbands or parents and are often unable to 
remarry. Survivors face additional social stigma if they become pregnant or contract HIV as a 
result of their rapes. One survivor summarized this problem by saying, “I never told my husband 
what had happened to me. I feared his reaction to the rapes, and I had no other relatives I could 
turn to” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 70). Due to the intimate and community-oriented 
nature of gacaca trials, survivors of sexual violence face a greater chance of rejection and social 
isolation when testifying at gacaca than in the conventional courts.  
 Victim-blaming attitudes and discourse that minimizes the effects of rape are especially 
prevalent in Rwandan society. Human Rights Watch identified government officials who 
believed that women could “[bring] on a rape by being drunk” or that “there are good reasons to 
disbelieve adult women when they report rape” (Amick 2011, 79). The Rwandan legislature 
admitted in 2006 that “Rwandan society had come to tolerate, even accept with impunity, acts of 
violence against women” (Amick 2011, 80). Many women, especially those held in situations of 
sexual slavery, were forced to have sexual intercourse in exchange for their lives; in such cases 
doubt was often cast on the survivor’s lack of consent (Rubio-Marin 2006, 209).  
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Because this stigma was widely recognized as a barrier to testifying, the Gacaca Law of 
2008 attempted to put protections in place for survivors of sexual violence. These survivors were 
permitted to submit their testimonies to the gacaca courts in writing rather than in public 
hearings (Brounéus 2008, 72) and all formal proceedings concerning cases of sexual violence 
were to be held “in camera,” behind closed doors, to protect the witnesses’ privacy (Republic of 
Rwanda 2008, 16). Gacaca also experimented with “women only” courts and courts in which one 
judge heard a survivor’s testimony and then reported it back to the full gacaca court (Morris 
2014, 36). These provisions failed to protect most survivors, however, both because they were 
inconsistently implemented and because they were insufficient to prevent rumors and 
speculations within small communities (Morris 2014, 36; Haskell 2011, 114). Additionally, 
while normal gacaca hearings make use of popular participation to hold inyangamugayo, 
witnesses, or perpetrators accountable for telling the truth, closed gacaca sessions cannot provide 
this protection (Haskell 2011, 112). Overall, rather than addressing the root issues which 
prevented women from testifying, these provisions simply “cradle[d] this stigmatization” (Amick 
2011, 75).  
 
Violence and Intimidation  
 Though all genocide survivors risk violence when testifying against their neighbors at 
gacaca, evidence suggests that there is a greater risk of re-victimization and continued violence 
for rape survivors than for those who speak about other crimes at gacaca. A 2002 survey by the 
NURC reports “unanimous agreement…that the risks of testifying female survivors [sic] are 
much greater than those of their male counterparts” (Wells 2005, 187).  
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Many survivors have faced intimidation and threats of violence from perpetrators 
attempting to silence their testimony, both before and during gacaca hearings. One survivor 
reported in an interview, “one of her perpetrators looks through her keyhole at night and asks her 
if she knows when the Interahamwe are coming” (Brounéus 2008, 67). Community members 
often shout or make insulting comments during gacaca hearings (Brounéus 2008, 68). These 
methods have proved to be an effective method of preventing women from giving their 
testimonies. One survivor summarizes the problem this way: “I was afraid when I gave 
testimony in the gacaca because people were yelling….Afterwards, they came; they broke my 
windows….I thought I would be killed….I do not go to gacaca any longer. I am scared to be 
attacked or killed. My sister was killed…after she had given testimony” (Brounéus 2008, 68). 
Indeed, survivors of sexual violence repeatedly report that intimidation by their perpetrators 
prevented them from testifying. “I kept quiet because I saw that I was not safe enough,” states 
one survivor, while another asserts that she “will never testify at the gacaca courts, because [her] 
sister was beaten on her way home from the gacaca courts where she appeared as a witness.” 
(Brounéus 2008, 67; De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 105). “Those who wronged me did not 
face justice,” states one survivor. “I cannot go to the gacaca courts as long as they are still free, 
because I am afraid the Interahamwe will kill me” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 103). 
Violence serves both to silence witnesses and also to punish “those who make the 
mistake of testifying” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 105). Many survivors discuss how 
giving testimony has led to a resumption of violence from their perpetrators. “Before giving 
testimony, things were better,” states one survivor, “but, after gacaca everything has changed, 
because they…destroy my house, break my windows” (Brounéus 2008, 66). Another survivor 
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claims “Before, I was not afraid….Afterwards, they considered me an enemy….My enemies 
sought a way to kill me” (Brounéus 2008, 67). 
Threats, intimidation, and retributive violence are particularly damaging for survivors of 
sexual violence because of their social and physical vulnerability and the unique nature of the 
trauma they suffered during the genocide. Moreover, perpetrators can use sexual violence itself 
as their form of retributive violence, maximizing the trauma and fear experienced by survivors. 
Even female inyangamugayo are not safe from being raped; four men were arrested in 2007 for 
gang-raping a gacaca judge after she testified against them at a hearing (“Police” 2007). 
 
Lack of Communication Concerning Sexual Acts 
 According to AVEGA, “in pure Rwandese tradition the woman…does not like to talk 
about anything concerning her modesty” (Amick 2011, 19). More than just cultural taboo, it is 
linguistically difficult for Rwandans to discuss sex or sexual violence, as “the words to describe 
some sexual acts do not even exist in Kinyarwanda” (Carpenter 2008, 647). Witnesses have used 
euphemisms that translate to “we got married” or “to share a bed” to describe their rapes, making 
it difficult for courts to establish a clear record of what occurred during the genocide (Koomen 
2013, 265). One Rwandan court interpreter summarized it this way: “In my culture you don’t say 
the words for genitalia. But in court you have to. It is a shock for interpreters, as well as 
witnesses. And graphic descriptions of rape are an ordeal for women. And the interpreter may be 
a woman too” (Koomen 2013, 265-266). These linguistic and cultural challenges pose a 
significant barrier to women wishing to testify about their experiences of rape in gacaca and 
conventional courts alike.   
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Structural Barriers within Gacaca Law  
 Legal and procedural features of the Gacaca Law posed additional barriers for survivors 
of sexual violence. Inconsistency and lack of popular understanding surrounding gacaca and its 
role in trying sexual crimes meant that many cases were never properly reported. The original 
2001 Gacaca Law and its subsequent modifications provided several varying, often conflicting 
avenues for reporting crimes of sexual violence. Unlike other crimes, sexual violence crimes 
could not be reported by third parties (Republic of Rwanda 2004, 17). Though this feature of the 
Gacaca Law was designed to protect these survivors from stigma, it also prevented rape cases 
from being reported in the manner with which Rwandans were most familiar (Amick 2011, 76). 
While most cases were placed on lists according to geographical location during the information 
gathering stage of gacaca, the prohibition on third party reporting meant that many cases of 
sexual violence never ended up on these lists. Moreover, both officials and citizens were unsure 
at which level to raise these cases because of their classification as a Category 1 crime (Amick 
2011, 81). Prior to the transfer of sexual crimes to gacaca, a 2001 survey of Rwandan 
perceptions of the gacaca system revealed that, of those surveyed who were aware of gacaca, 
only nine percent understood that the tribunals would not try rape cases (Gabisirege and Babalola 
2001, 11). Many survivors did not understand that it was necessary to report their rapes 
specifically and were waiting for their perpetrators’ cases to come up at gacaca hearings to give 
their testimonies (Amick 2011, 81).  
Even when survivors did bring rape cases to the authorities, fifty percent of those 
surveyed reported that their complaints were never registered (Amick 2011, 79). Additionally, 
survivors who had reported their rapes before 2008, thinking that conventional courts would 
adjudicate their cases, found their cases transferred to gacaca and exposed to their communities 
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without their permission (Haskell 2011, 112). The definitions of “rape” and “sexual torture” 
were unclear, leading to inconsistent categorization of cases of sexual violence. Moreover, the 
uncertainty and confusion surrounding the reporting process discouraged some survivors from 
even attempting to participate in gacaca (Amick 2011, 83). 
 Many survivors of sexual violence were not even allowed to bring their cases to gacaca. 
Despite that many rapes occurred after the genocide was “officially” over, and that these rapes 
were often motivated by or the direct result of the genocide, these cases were not processed 
through gacaca (Mibenge 2013). Moreover, gacaca laws required that survivors be able to name 
their perpetrators and that perpetrators be physically present at gacaca hearings in the sector 
where the rape took place (Morris 2014, 37). According to Haskell (2011), half of the rape 
victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch had been unable to bring their cases to gacaca 
because they did not know their perpetrator or because he had died (116). Morris (2013) also 
identified this as the primary reason that many rape survivors did not take their cases to gacaca; 
exactly fifty percent of the rape survivors she interviewed who did not take their cases to gacaca 
stated that this was because they did not know their perpetrator or that their perpetrator had died 
or fled the country (Morris 2014, 81). 
 It is logical that many survivors of sexual violence did not know their perpetrators 
personally, as this is true in the majority of cases of rape in the context of war and rapists during 
the Rwandan genocide often passed through unknown communities as part of the military or as 
Interahamwe (Morris 2014, 81). Stated one survivor, “I couldn’t accuse the ones who raped me 
even if I wanted to, since those rapes happened far from Kigali, and I don’t know who those men 
are” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 135). From a punitive justice standpoint, this feature of 
the Gacaca Law is reasonable and is consistent with most court systems internationally, as it is 
 45!
impossible to try suspects who are unknown, not present, or dead. However, survivors may have 
wished to speak about their experiences of sexual violence at gacaca to help establish an official 
record of events, to contribute to the community narratives of the genocide, or to benefit from the 
“healing” aspects of truth-telling—all supposed objectives of the gacaca system. An alternative 
transitional justice mechanism which allowed survivors to tell their stories without the aim of 
punitive justice, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, may have been beneficial in such 
cases. 
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Chapter 5: The Failure of Gacaca to Achieve its Transitional Justice 
Objectives for Survivors of Sexual Violence 
Gacaca courts were supposed to bring justice and reconciliation, but they are bringing more 
tears than smiles. 
-Pascasie Mukasakindi!!
(Survivor of sexual violence from the Rwandan genocide)11!
!
 Taken together, these barriers presented a grim prospect for sexual violence survivors 
who wished to seek justice through the gacaca courts. As Megan Carpenter (2008) argues, “the 
gacaca tribunals are simply not designed to accommodate this cultural context” (647). Indeed, 
the gacaca system was not designed with survivors of sexual violence in mind at all. While 
gacaca was originally intended to achieve a wide range of pragmatic and profound objectives, 
the primary factor in the decision to transfer rape cases to gacaca was the practical goal of 
rapidly processing genocide cases. The broader social goals of revealing the truth and providing 
justice to survivors of the genocide were not reexamined as part of this decision, and gacaca 
continued to work towards objectives that were either not relevant or were directly harmful to 
these survivors.   
 
Truth 
 Like many other genocide survivors, survivors of sexual violence have frequently spoken 
about their desire to tell the truth about their experiences during the genocide. A study conducted 
in 2013 by Meghan Morris found that among survivors of sexual violence who chose to take 
their cases to gacaca, the primary factor motivating their decision was that they “wanted to share 
their story” or they “felt it important to speak publicly about what happened to them” (78). When !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11. This quote is taken from Anne-Marie De Brouwer and Sandra Ka Hon Chu’s 2009 
collection of testimonies of survivors of sexual violence The Men Who Killed Me, page 77.  
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asked why they chose to tell their stories, the rape survivors interviewed for de Brouwer and Ka 
Hon Chu’s collection The Men Who Killed Me (2009) repeatedly emphasized a desire for 
recognition of what had happened to them. For many, a formal acknowledgment of their rapes 
was also linked to a desire for monetary assistance or distributive justice: “I hope that some of 
those who read this testimony will help genocide survivors, because we urgently need help” 
(110). Others expressed fear that their experiences would be forgotten or denied and wished for 
recognition from the international community, with one woman stating “I hope that my 
testimony will be proof of what happened in Rwanda. Some people deny this part of our history, 
but it is a reality they must face” (110). Many survivors believed that talking about their 
experiences of rape during the genocide would help prevent similar crimes in the future: “When 
more people learn the truth, I hope that their voices will add to the chorus of those ensuring such 
crimes will never happen again” (57); “We must never let this happen again and must build a 
better world for our children” (136).  
 All of these responses point to the necessity of including sexual violence crimes in the 
historical narrative of the genocide. Establishing an official account of events is an important 
goal of transitional justice systems and an explicit objective of gacaca, for without an 
understanding of the facts it is impossible to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions. 
Publicly condemning atrocities is a way to “[restore] the humanity of the victim and her value in 
society” (Nowrojee 2005, 6). This is especially true for survivors of sexual violence, as victim-
blaming, stigma, and silence surrounding rape may lead survivors to blame themselves. 
Moreover, without explicit sanctions against sexual violence, perpetrators and potential 
perpetrators may not realize that sexual violence is “wrong” or may continue to perpetrate sexual 
violence in the future. Evidence suggests that this might be especially true in the Rwandan case. 
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Based on interviews of prisoners in Kigali conducted by Mark Drumbl in 1998, Emily Amick 
(2011) concludes that “the combination of tendencies in Rwanda to minimize sexual violence as 
a crime, a lack of identification of genocide crimes as ‘wrong,’ and a limited community 
discussion regarding sexual violence crimes provides for a worrisome future outlook” (93).  
Despite the necessity of public recognition of sexual violence crimes, gacaca has not 
proved to be an appropriate mechanism through which to incorporate these crimes into 
community and historical narratives. Provisions designed to protect the privacy of survivors 
actually inhibit their stories from becoming a part of the “truth” of the genocide established at 
gacaca. Though typical gacaca hearings allow the community to come together, listen to 
confessions and testimonies, and establish a joint understanding of the events that occurred in 
their communities during the genocide, the private “in camera” sessions for sexual violence cases 
remove rape from the public discussion and therefore condemnation of rape is “not woven into 
the common morality” (Amick 2011, 92). Women’s limited participation in gacaca means that 
their stories do not become “part of the common language that will move the country forward” 
(Amick 2011, 89). 
Gacaca laws also prohibit perpetrators from publicly confessing to sexual violence crimes 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2008, 15). Again, while this provision was intended to protect survivors 
from having their rapes exposed to the community without their permission, it further excludes 
rape from the collective memory of what happened during the genocide. In a culture of severe 
victim-blaming, public admissions and apologies by perpetrators of sexual violence would go a 
long way in breaking the stigma of sexual assault and establishing a common morality in which 
sexual violence was considered a serious crime.  
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 However, as previously noted, revealing the truth has serious consequences for survivors 
of sexual violence. Though establishing a historical narrative and breaking the silence 
surrounding sexual violence are admirable goals, it is impossible to separate Rwandan survivors 
from their cultural context, in which the truth may result in social isolation, poverty, social 
vulnerability, and continued violence. While testifying at gacaca may help prevent future sexual 
violence in the long term, on the individual level it is more likely to result in social and economic 
vulnerability, retributive violence, and re-victimization.  
In addition to social consequences and physical danger, rape survivors risk considerable 
re-traumatization by telling their stories at gacaca. According to a 2014 study conducted by 
Brounéus, female survivors in Rwanda experienced more war-related traumatic events than male 
survivors and “met the criteria for both depression and PTSD to a significantly higher extent than 
men” (138). She also found that social support was a significant factor in protecting against 
PTSD, particularly among women (144), but many survivors of sexual violence cannot benefit 
from this protection because they lost family members during the genocide or were rejected by 
their communities.  
The Rwandan government also recognized the “healing” benefit of truth-telling is as an 
important goal of transitional justice, and was recognized from the outset as an objective of the 
gacaca system. However, according to David Mendeloff (2004), many of the claims regarding 
the positive psychological benefits of truth-telling are “flawed or highly contentious” (355). In 
fact, in recent years many transitional justice scholars have begun to question the underlying 
assumption that truth-telling is inherently cathartic or will naturally advance reconciliation. 
Rather, there is substantial evidence to suggest that being forced to relive experiences of the 
genocide at gacaca leads to re-traumatization and increased psychological ill-health. According 
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to a study conducted in 2006 by Karen Brounéus, survivors who witnessed in the gacaca courts 
had a 20 percent higher relative risk of depression and a 40 percent higher relative risk of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) than those survivors who did not witness in gacaca (408).  
Because female survivors of sexual violence are already more vulnerable to 
psychological ill-health than other survivors, it is no surprise that they experience the negative 
effects of witnessing at gacaca to a greater extent than others. “Traumatization, ill-health, 
isolation, and insecurity dominate the lives” of female witnesses at gacaca (Brounéus 2008, 57). 
Many women explained that discussing their experiences of sexual assault caused them to relive 
their trauma. “I felt very bad. I felt as if it were 1994 again” stated one survivor (Brounéus 2008, 
70). Even when survivors themselves did not testify, listening to the testimonies of others was 
sometimes triggering for survivors of sexual assault; one survivor notes: “each time I go [to 
gacaca] I become very traumatized, seeing myself being raped in the forest again” (De Brouwer 
and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 135).  
Public and private gacaca hearings alike force survivors to see and confront their rapists, 
a requirement which is often too much for those who have endured sexual assault. “I never went 
to the gacaca court when they were being tried because I could not bear to see them again,” 
explains one survivor. “I didn’t want to give them the satisfaction of seeing me retraumatized” 
(De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 116). Many survivors reported having “crises” or episodes 
of traumatisme—“reliving the trauma very strongly, crying, shaking uncontrollably, or fainting” 
(Brounéus 2008, 69). One survivor of sexual violence from the genocide explained having a 
“psychological crisis” during her testimony: “When you give testimony surrounded by people 
who have killed your family…you feel ill; you feel insane….Now, they do not let me speak at 
the gacaca. They say I am insane” (Brounéus 2008, 69). Survivors were often removed from 
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gacaca hearings following episodes of traumatisme and not allowed to return to finish giving 
their testimony. What is worse, perpetrators and other community members often exploit the 
trauma of witnesses to sabotage their testimony, harassing witnesses and describing their own 
crimes in graphic detail with the intention of triggering survivors so that they would not be 
allowed to continue giving their testimony (Brounéus 2008, 68-69). Without exception, all of the 
survivors of sexual violence that Brounéus (2008) interviewed linked testifying at gacaca to 
psychological ill-health (70). 
 
Justice  
 Survivors of sexual violence sought many different types of justice when taking their 
cases to gacaca. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, gacaca was designed to achieve punitive, 
deterrent, distributive, and restorative justice. Once again, however, these goals were not 
reevaluated to consider the special needs of survivors of sexual violence, and were therefore not 
attained for these survivors.  
 
Punitive and Deterrent Justice  
 Though between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women experienced sexual violence 
during the genocide, only 6,608 of these women saw their cases tried by the gacaca courts 
(Morris 2014, 36).12 Among those women who did have their cases heard in gacaca, many 
expressed disappointment that their testimonies did not result in the conviction of their 
perpetrators or that their perpetrators had been released from prison. One survivor sums up her 
frustration this way:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12. Morris (2014) notes that this figure comes from the gacaca courts themselves, 
suggesting that it may in fact be exaggerated. 
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I accused them in the gacaca courts, including the one who raped me…but now they are 
being released. Gacaca courts do not bring justice. I think the best punishment those men 
could get is the death penalty, because they killed others, too. We need justice. The 
génocidaires should not be released. (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 33) 
 
The desire for the death penalty has been echoed repeatedly by survivors of sexual violence, 
many of whom believed that perpetrators should “be killed as they killed our people” (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 103). Because sexual crimes were originally placed in Category 
1, they should indeed have fallen within the range of crimes that incurred a death penalty, but the 
plea-bargaining system and lightened sentences of gacaca do not provide for this level of 
punitive justice (Republic of Rwanda 2001, 25).  
Without providing adequate punitive justice for survivors of sexual violence, there is 
little hope that the judgments of these courts will deter perpetrators from committing sexual 
violence in the future. Because processing sexual violence cases through gacaca was so difficult 
and so few were adjudicated, and because perpetrators received light or no sentences for their 
sexual violence crimes, it is unlikely that these cases will led to an increased recognition of the 
seriousness of rape or reverse the culture of impunity surrounding sexual violence in Rwanda.  
 
Distributive Justice 
One third of the Rwandan rape survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch 
“expressed frustration with the fact that they had received no monetary compensation after the 
accused had been convicted” (Haskell 2011, 115). Despite the vital role of reparations within 
transitional justice programs, gacaca has failed to provide meaningful reparations for genocide 
survivors in Rwanda. Though the 1996 Organic Law makes mention of an indemnification fund 
for survivors (known as the Fonds d’Indemnisation, or FIND), this fund was never established. 
According to draft laws concerning this fund launched in 2001 and 2002, gacaca tribunals were 
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supposed to be responsible for compiling lists of damages and beneficiaries and reporting them 
to FIND, who would then award reparations based on the recommendations of gacaca (Rubio-
Marin 2006, 199). Though these lists still exist and therefore could be used as the basis for 
awarding reparations (Rubio-Marin 2006, 200), lack of political will and insufficient financing 
make it unlikely that survivors will ever receive the reparations to which they are entitled Rubio-
Marin 2006, 227).13 
The lack of distributive justice for Rwandan genocide survivors has been a grave 
miscarriage of justice, and one of the most significant failures of gacaca. This failure has been 
especially devastating to female survivors of sexual violence due to their increased economic 
vulnerability and risk of poverty, as discussed further in Chapter 5. Effectively incorporating 
reparations into transitional justice programs requires carefully considering “gendered notions of 
reparations, and differential needs of victims based on gender” (Morris 2014, 40). Established at 
the International Meeting on Women’s and Girl’s Right to a Remedy and Reparation in 2007, the 
Nairobi Declaration emphasized the importance of a gender-sensitive approach to reparations 
provision, stating that because of the unique nature of human rights violations against women, 
reparations must be “specially adapted to their needs, interests and priorities, as defined by them” 
(2). In cases of sexual violence especially, “governments should take into account the multi-
dimensional and long-term consequences of these crimes” and therefore reparations “must go 
above and beyond the immediate reasons and consequences of the crimes…[to] address the 
political and structural inequalities that negatively shape women’s and girls’ lives” (5). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13. Interestingly, though the international donor community financially supports gacaca, 
there has been little interest from international donors to contribute to reparations funds. 
Rombouts (2006) suggests that this “hesitant attitude” is in part due to the fear of certain 
countries that contributing to reparations could be interpreted as an acknowledgment of partial 
responsibility for the genocide, a responsibility which the international community refuses to 
acknowledge (227). 
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Indeed, while reparations have most often been defined in international law by the ideal 
of restitutio in integrum, which focuses on restoring the survivor to his or her financial or social 
status prior to the violation, female survivors tend to “express preference for services to meet 
their basic needs and those of their family members over restitution of lost property or monetary 
compensation in proportion to harm or for lost opportunities” (Rubio-Marin 2006, 29). Rather 
than demanding lump sums or reparations designed to compensate them for their material losses 
during the genocide, Rwandan women have requested specific forms of economic assistance that 
reflected their needs as survivors of sexual violence. For many, this request has consisted of 
medical assistance to help them treat HIV/AIDS or financial support for children of rape. Other 
women have requested assistance with agricultural work, either in the form of seeds and planting 
materials or money to hire laborers, as many female survivors sustained injuries that prevent 
them from working in the fields and/or have lost their children and male relatives to the genocide 
(Morris 2014, 75). Some survivors expressed a desire for assistance with transportation costs so 
that they could attend gacaca hearings (Morris 2014, 75). Neither the gender-specific kinds of 
reparations requested by these survivors nor their increased need for economic assistance in 
general was considered when adopting gacaca as an instrument of transitional justice.  
 
Restorative Justice 
As discussed in Chapter 3, punitive and distributive justice are vital prerequisites for 
restorative justice. Herman (2003) argues that the victim must also be guaranteed physical safety 
if restorative justice is to be achieved (163). As we have seen, however, survivors of sexual 
violence have rarely seen punitive or distributive justice, and are often subjected to increased 
violence as a result of testifying at gacaca. Furthermore, gacaca has often been disruptive to 
 55!
community reconciliation, especially in cases of sexual violence. Because the gacaca system was 
not implemented until nearly a decade after the genocide, “a natural, if very difficult, process of 
cohabitation…had already begun” (Ingelaere 2009, 515). Out of sheer necessity, Rwandans had 
begun learning to live together again, enabled by a culture of “silence about the past” (Ingelaere 
2009, 515). One survivor said that Rwandans tried to forget and coexist, claiming that survivors 
and perpetrators “even prayed together” (Brounéus 2008, 66).  
Despite its objective of restorative justice, the implementation of gacaca created 
considerable concern that the open discussion of genocide crimes would disrupt this natural 
process of restoring relationships within communities. Bert Ingelaere (2009) analyzes a series of 
surveys conducted by the NURC between 2002 and 2008 assessing Rwandan perceptions of 
gacaca. According to his findings, 49 percent of those surveyed in 2002 believed that “testimony 
by the population at large during gacaca [would] aggravate tensions between families,” and by 
2006 this figure had increased to 55 percent (512).  
Revelations about sexual violence were considered especially inflammatory and 
detrimental to reconciliation. According to Wells (2005), genocide survivors suggest that crimes 
of sexual violence are more difficult to forgive than other crimes committed during the genocide, 
and because these crimes were deemed “unforgivable and their consequences insurmountable,” 
Rwandans worried that revealing these crimes was more likely to damage community 
relationships than to restore them (188). Ingalaere’s study confirmed this: though in 2002 only 
26 percent of Rwandans agreed to the statement “revelations of rape will hinder the 
reconciliation process,” by 2006 this figure had increased to 34 percent (512). As Rwandans 
began to see the negative impact that testifying at gacaca had on reconciliation processes within 
communities, their “belief in the appropriateness of gacaca to deal with sexual violence 
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cases…diminished over time” (Amick 2011, 64-65). Rather than acting as a mechanism to 
restore relationships between perpetrators, survivors, and their communities, gacaca disrupted 
reconciliation processes and further damaged community ties in the case of sexual crimes.  
 
Justice for Whom? 
Evidently, the gacaca courts failed to meet the objectives of transitional justice for 
survivors of sexual violence. Although the Rwandan government endeavored to establish a 
transitional justice system that pursued a range of objectives, a lack of gender analysis meant that 
these objectives were not equally met for all participants in gacaca. Due to the differential nature 
of the crimes inflicted on them, Sarah Wells (2005) argues that “community based and 
participatory models of justice may not equitably serve the interests of both women and men” 
(188). Despite that “the type of justice that survivors of rape during genocide seek, the type of 
truth that they feel free to tell, and the level of reconciliation that they seek can be quite different 
from that of other survivors” (Morris 2014, 41), the government chose to expand a ‘one size fits 
all’ solution to genocide crimes of vastly different natures, neglecting and sacrificing the needs 
of rape survivors in the process. 
The most poignant example of the manner in which the Rwandan government has 
sacrificed the needs of survivors of sexual violence for greater political or practical goals lies in 
their insistence that survivors of sexual violence have a moral obligation to contribute to the 
establishment of a historical narrative of the genocide. The original Gacaca Law required that all 
survivors testify, claiming that “the duty to testify is a moral obligation, nobody having the right 
to get out of it for whatever reason it may be” (Republic of Rwanda 2001, 2), and going on to say 
that “any person who omits or refuses to testify on what he/she has seen or on what he/she 
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knows…risks a prison sentence from 1 to 3 years” (12). Subsequent modifications of the law 
upheld this requirement even for survivors of sexual violence—despite their much greater danger 
of social rejection, violence, and trauma. Many scholars uphold this ‘moral obligation.’ The 
OAU (2000) report on gacaca states unequivocally that “victims of rape must be asked to make 
the extraordinary effort of addressing this painful topic publicly if adequate care and justice are 
to be provided” (149), and Maggie Zraly refers to the need for survivors of sexual violence to 
testify as the “survivor mission” (398). According to Wells (2005), even Rwandan survivors’ 
rights activists often believe that because they make up the majority of the survivor population, 
“women have an ‘obligation to testify’” (183). Though this argument is logical from a practical 
standpoint, this is a wholly inappropriate and grossly insensitive demand to make of genocide 
rape survivors considering the extraordinary nature of the trauma that they have suffered.  
Karen Brounéus (2010) has suggested that truth-telling may be more beneficial in some 
cases for those who did not know the extent of past atrocities than for those who were “directly 
involved and targeted by the violence” (411). In other words, truth-telling processes risk re-
traumatizing survivors in order to educate others. Rwandan rape survivors have indeed been 
tasked with the brutal responsibility of educating the whole society about what happened to them 
during the Rwandan genocide. Rather than admitting this responsibility directly, however, the 
government rhetoric regarding gacaca appeals to the supposedly ‘healing’ nature of truth-telling 
to provide justification for these demands on survivors. In an attempt to establish a historical 
narrative about the genocide, the Rwandan state has placed the “obligation to testify” on the 
group of people to whom it was most likely to cause serious harm. Moreover, in failing to 
provide adequate confidentiality, witness protection, and reparations to survivors, the Rwandan 
state further endangered their most vulnerable citizens in the name of “transitional justice.” 
 58!
 To quote Wendy Lambourne (2001), “the question of ‘justice for whom?’ is relevant 
here” (325). It is certainly true that, before closing in 2012, gacaca achieved many of its 
objectives as a transitional justice mechanism. In just over ten years, “1,958,634 genocide related 
cases were tried through gacaca” (“Gacaca”). In theory, without an alternative judicial 
mechanism it would have taken the ICTR and the Rwandan courts over 200 years to try all of 
these cases (Haskell 2011, 15). The official website of gacaca claims that, according to a study 
done by the National University of Rwanda, 95 percent of Rwandans believe that gacaca was 
successful in “demonstrating the capacity of Rwandans to resolve their own problems,” 86.4 
percent agree that it has “[put] an end to the culture of impunity,” and 87.3 percent believe that it 
has “strengthen[ed] unity and reconciliation” (“Gacaca”).14 Phil Clark (2010) also agrees “gacaca 
has…proven effective in many communities at initiating processes of restorative justice, healing, 
forgiveness and reconciliation” (342).  
Hailed as “one of the boldest and more original ‘legal-social’ experiments ever attempted 
in the field of transitional justice,” (Goldstein Bolocan 2004, 355-356), gacaca is arguably the 
“most extensive post-conflict justice system in human history” (“Gacaca”) and has received 
widespread praise from scholars, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations. By 2011, the EU 
and several sovereign nations had contributed almost $25 million to supporting the gacaca 
system (Haskell 2011, 127-129). Obviously, the Rwandan government has enjoyed the 
reputation and financial support garnered by the gacaca system. Because of this prestige and the 
pressure to try genocide-rape cases created by the international significance of the Akayesu 
decision, the Rwandan state has had a vested interest in appearing proactive about sexual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14. Though these numbers are impressive, it is important to note that there is a possibility 
of bias or exaggeration, given that they were published by the gacaca website itself. Further 
information about the study was not provided by the website.  
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violence crimes—and in using gacaca to do it. The lack of meaningful justice provided to 
survivors of sexual violence through the gacaca system, however, prompted one rape survivor to 
say, “it seems that our testimonies in gacaca courts are more formalities than truly helpful” (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 123), while another contended that many aspects of gacaca 
were designed only to “keep up appearances” (Morris 2014, 65).   
Rwanda’s decision to include sexual violence cases within the jurisdiction of gacaca 
clearly was “in the interests of its new government more than in the interests of its citizens” 
(Morris 2014, 27). Though gacaca has been considered “restorative” to the Rwandan society as a 
whole, this system has not provided restorative justice to individual survivors of sexual violence, 
for whom “individual healing [has been] sacrificed for ‘societal peace’” (Morris 2014, 28).  
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Chapter 6: An Alternative Model of Justice for Survivors of Sexual Violence 
in Rwanda 
What good is truth or compensation if you are dying? 
-Sexual violence survivor, living with HIV/AIDS15 
 
Survivors of sexual violence from the genocide have typically defined justice in vastly 
different terms than those of the Rwandan government. Because many of these survivors live in 
extreme poverty, with HIV/AIDS, and/or without social or economic support from husbands or 
families, they want a transitional justice system that would “prioritize redress for the collateral 
harms they suffer today before the criminal punishment of their rapists from ten years ago” 
(Wells 2005, 196). As summarized by Morris (2014): 
The fact that multiple dimensions of women’s lives were affected by rape—their health, 
their mental health, their family structures, their access to income…their housing—
cannot be ignored. These very real challenges bring daily reminders of rape, and may 
factor greatly in how women perceive and define justice, and in what ways they seek 
justice for rapes they experienced. (25) 
 
Rather than continue to seek restorative justice for survivors of sexual violence through a system 
which was not designed to meet their needs, an effective transitional justice program in Rwanda 
would evaluate the way in which these survivors define justice for themselves and prioritize the 
objectives they wish to achieve through transitional justice institutions. 
Survivor-run women’s organizations are prevalent throughout Rwanda, “in large part due 
to the absence of government and other services”  (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 152). 
Because “survivors understand the unique needs of their peers” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 
2009, 152), these organizations are better positioned to define the transitional justice objectives 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15. Interview conducted with AVEGA member, survivor of wartime rape, sexual slavery, 
forced marriage, now living with HIV/AIDS. Quoted from Sarah Wells (2005), 194-195.  
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of survivors of sexual violence than is the Rwandan state. When we reframe the objectives of 
transitional justice to align with the needs of survivors of sexual violence, it becomes apparent 
that community-based, women-centered nonprofit organizations “can be responsible for 
promoting, delivering and achieving the goals of transitional justice” (Tobin 2012, 33). 
According to Angela Tobin (2012), such organizations can be “understood as…example[s] of 
non-judicial community justice” (36). In this final chapter, I will identify several transitional 
justice objectives highlighted by survivors—namely financial assistance, healthcare, trauma 
counseling, social support, and empowerment programs—and demonstrate why community-
based, women-centered organizations which are designed around these objectives are better 
suited to provide restorative justice to survivors of sexual violence than is the state system of 
gacaca. 
 
Economic Assistance  
Even before the genocide, Rwanda’s traditional patriarchal society limited women’s 
access to legal rights, education, or economic independence from their husbands. Women could 
not obtain credit, open a bank account, or accept formal employment without their husbands’ 
permission (Amick 2011, 17). This lack of economic opportunity for women created major 
problems for Rwandan families following the genocide, as female survivors were five times 
more likely to be widowed than male survivors, and traditional Rwandan society dictated that 
women should not remarry (Wells 2005, 183; Tobin 2012, 29). As a result, immediately 
following the genocide, an estimated fifty percent of households in Rwanda were headed by 
women (Morris 2014, 22), who, due to their lack of access to income or property, were expected 
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to provide for themselves and their families with “significantly fewer material resources than 
their male counterparts” (Wells 2005, 183).  
 Rwandan customary laws concerning property and inheritance were huge obstacles for 
female survivors attempting to provide for themselves and their children. Until 1999, women 
were not allowed to own land or inherit it from their husbands or fathers, meaning that widows 
had no claim to their land or homes after the death of their husbands (Rombouts 2006, 210). 
Even after 1999, the law maintained that widows must have been legally married to their 
husbands to inherit land, despite many couples in rural areas never having formal marriage 
ceremonies (Rombouts 2006, 205). Because most families in Rwanda still rely on subsistence 
farming, access to land is crucial for economic survival. Moreover, women are more reliant than 
men on subsistence farming, as they are less likely to engage in non-agricultural income 
generation due to lack of access to education or other employment opportunities (Rombouts 
2006, 204-205). 
 Experiences of rape have exacerbated an already dire financial situation for many female 
genocide survivors. As previously noted, many women were abandoned by their husbands after 
being raped or were seen by potential suitors as “unmarriable.” Chances of marriage or 
remarriage were even slimmer for those women who had lost their ability to bear children or who 
had contracted HIV/AIDS because of their rapes (Morris 2014, 23). Additionally, many women 
were left to financially support children born as a result of forced impregnation. Ironically, 
children born as a result of rape from the genocide are typically not considered official 
“survivors” by the RPF government because they have Hutu fathers, and are therefore not 
entitled to the same social services that orphans and other children who survived the genocide 
receive from the government (Morris 2014, 23). Rape survivors often suffer from injuries that 
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prevent them from working in the fields, and because of the stigma attached to rape, some 
survivors were denied employment in stores and markets (Morris 2014, 23). Due to this same 
stigma, survivors of sexual violence are also less likely than other genocide survivors to be able 
to rely on their families or communities for financial assistance.  
Financial assistance is therefore a primary transitional justice objective for survivors of 
sexual violence and one of the most important functions of survivors' and women’s 
organizations, which often provide food, housing, and even transportation and childcare to their 
beneficiaries. According to an annual report from 2010, the Association for Widows and 
Orphans of Rwanda (AVEGA) is actively involved in providing food to its beneficiaries as well 
as assisting with school fees and improving sanitation conditions. In addition to helping meet 
these immediate needs, AVEGA also assists their beneficiaries in long-term, sustainable 
economic investments by donating goats, cows, pigs, and bees to widow-headed households and 
providing loans for their small business projects (AVEGA 2010, 1-2). Many community-based 
organizations also support income-generating projects (IGPs), which “provide beneficiaries with 
the capacity to earn their own income with the long-term goal of independence,” including 
agricultural activities, livestock trade, and making and selling crafts (Tobin 2012, 34). 
 
Healthcare 
Approximately seventy percent of survivors of sexual violence from the genocide are 
HIV positive (Amnesty International 2004, 3). Many survivors of sexual violence also require 
medical services to treat injuries sustained during their rapes, as a result of breast or genital 
mutilation, or as a result of unsafe abortions. However, financial insecurity, unavailability of 
health facilities, and stigmas surrounding rape and HIV have prevented many survivors of sexual 
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violence from accessing healthcare (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 146). According to a 
2002 survey, “only 6 percent of respondents who were raped during the genocide had ever 
sought medical treatment” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 146), and because HIV status 
contributes to poverty, only 28 percent of Rwandan households affected by HIV/AIDS are able 
to afford basic healthcare (Amnesty International 2004, 4). A 2008 report by the UN claimed that 
only 53 percent of Rwandan adults who required antiretroviral treatment were receiving it (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 146). Though the ICTR provided antiretrovirals to accused 
perpetrators awaiting trial, they failed to do so for witnesses (Amnesty International 2004, 20).  
It is the primary focus of some survivors’ organizations, therefore, to provide medical 
assistance to their beneficiaries. AVEGA, for example, provides anti-retroviral treatments, 
family planning programs, and vaccinations to widows and children as well as helping survivors 
access transportation to hospitals and funding the development of health clinics (AVEGA 2010, 
2). Solace Ministries, a survivor-run community organization in Kigali that supports widows, 
orphans, and survivors of sexual violence, also incorporated medication and education about 
HIV/AIDS into their mission. Immaculée Makumi, a beneficiary of Solace and survivor of 
sexual violence, poignantly explains, 
I used to think that I would rather be dead than living with HIV, but I have received 
comfort from a charity that also provides me with antiretroviral treatment and food. I 
know now that I can continue to live with HIV…I no longer hate who I am, and I feel my 
love for myself grow. (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 82) 
 
 
Psychological Health, Trauma Counseling, and Social Support 
 As noted, female survivors of sexual violence from the genocide are more vulnerable to 
psychological ill-health than are other survivors. Survivor organizations often work to address 
the mental health needs of their beneficiaries through individual and group counseling sessions, 
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as well as by providing beneficiaries with access to professional trauma counseling from 
hospitals (AVEGA 2010, 2). In addition to formal counseling, many survivors have identified 
positive mental health benefits, including “happiness and reduced trauma” (Tobin 2012, 36), as a 
result of the social support provided by the women’s organizations. Because of the social 
vulnerability and isolation experienced by many survivors of sexual violence, finding networks 
of support and sharing their experiences with other rape survivors is vital to their mental health. 
One survivor notes, “I find comfort and love through the support of those organizations and from 
seeing other widows who have the same problems. It makes me feel less lonely” (De Brouwer 
and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 77). Another survivor similarly explains, “Other widows and orphans 
have comforted me when I was in mourning and brought joy and laughter into my life when my 
heart was filled with pain and sorrow. I am now feeling less lonely and more secure” (De 
Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 48). It seems that survivors of sexual violence can indeed 
benefit from the therapeutic nature of truth-telling, provided that they have access to safe spaces 
for truth-telling in which they are not exposed to judgment, violence, or re-traumatization. 
Professional trauma counseling and survivor support group serve this function in ways that 
prosecutorial courts cannot.  
 
Empowerment and Women’s Rights 
Women’s organizations have the additional capacity to serve as sites of empowerment for 
survivors of sexual violence. After experiencing rape, many women feel a loss of power and 
control over their lives. This lack of control is exacerbated for Rwandan women by their loss of 
partners, children, and parents and by the social and economic vulnerability that accompanies 
their rapes. Survivors’ and women’s organizations work to provide a sense of accomplishment 
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and control for survivors of sexual violence in a number of ways. Because these survivors are 
often required to take on new financial responsibilities after the death of their husbands, 
including running businesses and managing money, many organizations provide small business 
loans and training programs in financial management (AVEGA 2010, 1-2; Tobin 2012, 3-4). 
Some survivor organizations run informational sessions to educate women on their legal rights 
and roles within transitional justice systems in an attempt to “demystify the process and address 
the particular concerns of survivors of sexual violence” (Morris 2014, 97).  
Most importantly, empowerment involves “critical consciousness and knowledge 
of…structural inequalities and oppression” (Lee 1994, 34). According to Meghan Morris’s 
(2012) definition, empowerment programs must “strengthen self-worth…[provide] validation 
through collective experience…contribute to critical thinking regarding injustice…[and involve] 
collective action” (47). Given the culture of impunity and stigma surrounding sexual violence in 
Rwanda, it is especially important for empowerment programs in this context to “involve a 
discussion around gendered violence, sexual violence, and how this relates to the role of women 
in Rwandan society” (Morris 2012, 49). By educating Rwandan women about the structural 
factors that have contributed to their victimization, women’s organizations can assist survivors to 
break the culture of silence surrounding their rapes and begin to heal.  
 
A Comprehensive Approach to Justice 
 Perhaps the major difference between community organizations and judicial measures 
such as gacaca is the holistic nature of their approach to justice. Time and again, organizations 
such as AVEGA and Solace Ministries demonstrate their commitment to achieving 
simultaneously many of the transitional justice objectives of survivors of sexual violence. 
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According to their website, AVEGA’s mission is to “work for the development and reintegration 
of widows and orphans of the Genocide and improve their psycho-socio-economic conditions in 
solidarity, justice and social peace” (AVEGA 2016), and this integrated approach is evident in 
many of the services the organization provides. Providing goats to widow-headed households, 
for example, was intended to “help alleviate [both] poverty and loneliness [emphasis mine]” 
(AVEGA 2010, 1). 
Recognizing that HIV infection can contribute to negative physical health, mental health, 
social status, and economic status simultaneously, Solace Ministries applied a comprehensive 
strategy to caring for HIV positive survivors by providing “counseling and therapy for post-
traumatic stress, nutritious food to maintain their health, stable housing, education about their 
illness, effective treatment, income-generating training, and resources such as school fees and 
materials to support the children and orphans they care for” (De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 2009, 
152). Empowerment programs educate women about feminism and structural inequalities while 
also reducing trauma, creating networks of social support, and assisting them to support 
themselves financially, understand their legal rights, and take control of their physical health and 
HIV management. Because of the interconnected nature of the problems that sexual violence 
survivors face, assistance offered to these women must logically address multiple issues 
objectives of transitional justice simultaneously.   
 
Implications for the Future 
It would be impossible for gacaca alone to provide adequate justice for every member of 
Rwandan society. Transitional justice requires integrating various institutions to address the wide 
range of objectives required to reconstruct a society and address the needs of survivors. Because 
 68!
they provide punitive justice, legal and judicial mechanisms have been necessary components of 
this reconstruction effort. Punishing war criminals is a necessary prerequisite for deterrent and 
restorative justice as well as for societal healing and reconciliation, and the “promotion of the 
rule of law and respect for human rights” is a necessary component of post-conflict peace 
building (Lambourne 2001, 311). The successes of gacaca on this front should not be dismissed. 
By focusing almost exclusively on judicial structures, however, the Rwandan transitional 
justice program has done little to address the underlying causes of the sexual violence that 
occurred during the genocide and did nothing to shift the structural barriers that rape survivors 
have faced to accessing justice. Though survivor-run women’s organizations have proved more 
effective at meeting the transitional justice objectives of these survivors than have the ICTR, the 
Rwandan national courts, or gacaca, these organizations have not been discussed as part of the 
official transitional justice program in Rwanda. Rather than continuing to rely exclusively on 
“the prosecutorial logic of the modern gacaca process” (Ingelaere 2009, 517) to provide 
restorative justice for survivors of sexual violence, the Rwandan state and international 
community should recognize the important contributions of survivors’ organizations to 
transitional justice. Including community-based, women-centered nonprofit organizations within 
the official framework of the transitional justice program in Rwanda would legitimize these 
organizations and provide the basis for funding from the international community. 
As summarized by de Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu (2009), an effective transitional justice 
program for Rwanda must 
address sexual violence in a systematic way…must re-evaluate cultural practices and 
judicial systems to ensure that they are inclusive and protect women against all forms of 
abuse. Laws must be developed that deal both with violence and with issues that affect 
women's rights in all spheres, such as property, inheritance, marriage and divorce. 
Creating a world free from sexual violence requires creating conditions where justice can 
flourish and strong laws can be enforced through a strong judicial system. (157-158)  
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In addition to trying criminals, a transitional justice system designed to support survivors of 
sexual violence would also address the cultural and legal factors behind the violence against 
women that occurred during the Rwandan genocide and the difficulties women in Rwanda 
continue to face today. Applying a gender analysis to laws and judicial structures such as gacaca 
in order to address the differing needs of survivors of sexual violence would be an important step 
towards ensuring justice for all Rwandans, but this alone is not enough. Attention must be paid to 
the importance of educating children, providing support for families, and empowering women in 
the wake of the genocide. Recognizing the important contributions of survivors’ and women’s 
organizations to the transitional justice effort in Rwanda and providing financial support to these 
organizations is the best way to achieve the goals of transitional justice for survivors of sexual 
violence, in both the short- and the long-term. 
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Appendix A:  
“General Dallaire and his army have fallen into the trap of the Tutsi femmes fatales.” 
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